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Abstract 
During the past two years, private equity funds have acquired substantial portfolios of non-
performing loans from banks in Germany. Typically a private equity investor does not 
commit funds unless exit strategies are clearly defined. The usual exit strategies for distressed 
debt investors are “fix it” (restructuring and turnaround), “sell it” (sale of debt or equity), or 
“shut it down” (liquidation). A new alternative exit strategy for NPL investors considered 
here is the “transfer” of credit recovery risk. 
The structure “Sector Focus Fund” (SFF), which corresponds to the credit risk transfer 
strategy “Triple Play”, is a partially funded synthetic securitization of non-performing loans to 
small and medium-sized enterprises in a specific sector. The SFF special purpose vehicle sells 
protection up to specified forward recovery rate to the NPL investment fund in the form of a 
credit recovery swap and buys this protection through a three-tranche, partially funded 
synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO). Title to the loans remains with the NPL 
investment fund, but responsibility for performance of the portfolio passes to the specialists of 
the SFF. 
Equity investors, who take the first loss position in the Sector Focus Fund’s CDO, provide 
funds for the collateral account held by the SFF by paying a premium to go long in a call 
option on the excess spread which accumulates when the realized recovery rate exceeds the 
forward recovery swap rate. Bondholders, which assume a mezzanine position, also provide 
funding for the collateral account, which serves to support the counterparty rating of the 
Sector Focus Fund. Repayment is assured as long as the shortfall in the recovery rate does not 
exceed the net premium paid to the SFF for the call option. The senior position is occupied by 
reinsurers, which are exposed to a short recovery option position. Their exposure is limited to 
extremely unlikely large shortfalls in the realized recovery rate below the forward recovery 
rate. A liquidity facility bridges the SFF’s transitory cash flow shortfalls. 
The SFF is incentivized to achieve recovery rates higher than the forward recovery swap rate 
through particpation of the portfolio managers in excess of the realized recovery rate over the 
forward recovery rate (“swap rate”). The SFF is able to achieve the excess by virtue of the 
portfolio managers’ specialized knowledge in the specific sector in which the borrowers are 
engaged and their specialized expertise in workout situations. Investors in the first-loss 
tranche benefit from reduced risk due to the high correlation of recoveries and high likelihood 
of high recovery rates due to the focus of the portfolio managers. Also, the higher recovery 
correlation raises the risk to senior investors but also enables them to achieve a yield pick-up 
within the bounds of their risk tolerance. 
The implication of the securitization framework of Basel II (substitution approach, 
disallowance of spread accounts as mitigant, overly conservative calibration) is that the 
regulatory capital charge for portfolios of loans hedged by credit default swaps is in excess of 
the economic capital required. Consequently, regulatory capital arbitrage will be triggered as 
unregulated non-banks, such as private equity funds, bond funds and credit reinsurance funds, 
are likely to become major investors in portfolios of credit risks that are hedged by credit Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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derivatives contracted with high and medium investment grade special purpose vehicles 
which act as counterparties. New asset classes, such as non-performing loans of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, are likely to be synthetically securitized in the future due to 
ongoing impulses for innovation in credit risk transfer (individual loan and portfolio recovery 
risk modeling, CDO modeling and pricing, recovery ratings for facilities , recovery data bases 
such as the Pan European Credit Data Consortium). 
Learning from experience gained in securitizing non-performing corporate loans in Asia (e.g. 
KAMCO) and Italy enables market participants to create innovative exit strategies and 
structures for NPL investors in Germany. It is likely that credit risk transfer by means of 
reverse syndication of recovery risk can be achieved within a year or so by the proposed 
“Triple Play” synthetic securitization transaction. Such transactions create economic value 
and improve social welfare by realizing gains from specialization (“division of knowledge”) 
made possible by prudent use of credit derivatives. The likely outcome is a significant 
increase in recovery rates of non-performing loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. A 
successful demonstration of the strategy’s benefits for recovery of non-performing loans 
would have the effect of increasing the political pressure for further liberalization of the legal 
and regulatory framework for credit risk transfer of distressed and non-distressed debt. 
Key words: focus, diversification, specialization, monitoring, bank returns, bank risk, Non 
Performing Loans, Distressed debt investing, Synthetic securitization, Collateralized debt 
obligations, Credit risk transfer, Credit derivatives, Credit default swaps, Credit recovery 
swaps, Credit portfolio management, Credit portfolio risk, Credit portfolio returns, Efficiency 
of credit risk portfolio allocations, Learning effects.  
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1. Preface 
This working paper is based on lectures given during the research colloquium organised by the 
HfB on December 15 th, 2005. The presentation of Christoph Schalast’s contribution closely 
resembles his original lecture, whereas Robert A. Dickler expanded his lecture considerably and 
added relevant footnotes. The authors would like to thank Prof. Dr. Paul G. Schmidt, director of 
the Centre for Financial Economics (CFE) at the HfB-Business School of Finance and 
Management, for his introduction at the colloquium and chairing the stimulating discussion that 
followed. We welcome any comments and suggestions on the subject area of Distressed Debt/ Non 
Performing Loans – which still remains inadequately considered and discussed academically – 
under schalast@hfb.de or robert.dickler@strateco.de.  
2. The German Distressed Debt Market (Christoph Schalast) 
In the last few years – beginning with the first transactions of international investors in 2003 – a 
dynamic market for distressed debt (or non-performing loans) evolved in Germany. At first sight, 
this may seem surprising as Germany is generally not considered to be a typical trading centre for 
non-performing loans. However, when taking into account the distinct historical and economic 
developments of the last 15 years, i.e. the reunification with all of its burdens as well as the fall in 
valuations in the real estate market, the reasons behind this development become apparent quickly. 
How this newly emerged market is being valued in business volume differs greatly. Ernst & Young 
in their Non-Performing-Loans-Report 2004 state a volume of up to € 300 billion, a figure which 
has also been repeatedly quoted in the press. But there are also much smaller numbers circulating. 
E.g. the study of Kroll & Mercer Oliver Wyman, put together in spring 2005, arrives at a much 
lower value of € 160 billion – but also repeatedly quoted in the press; moreover, the study 
differentiates between non-performing-loans (€ 125 billion) and sub-performing-loans. 
A difference of opinion also exists regarding the annual trading volume. Roland Berger Strategy 
Consultants in their study of November 2005 estimated the volume for the sector Corporate Loans 
in the year 2005 to be approx. € 13 billion and for Real Estate Loans approx. € 16.1 billion, 
however all German-Speaking countries, i.e. Germany, Austria and Switzerland, were included. 
Roland Berger dared to voice the prognosis that the market in 2006 would have the same overall 
volume as it did in 2005, whereas a shift from Real Estate Loans to Corporate Loans is expected. 
From 2007 onwards, a decrease in market activity (or rather: the volume of transactions) is 
presumed to take place. 
Regardless of whether one considers these figures to be realistic or not and what opinion one may 
have of the market and its perspectives, it is recognisable that the big portfolio transactions that 
have created a lot of public attention are on the decline in favour of the sale of single claims (or 
single names) and baskets. This shift to single claims and baskets corresponds closely with the 
generally presumed decrease in market shares of real estate loans and the increased significance of 
exposure to corporate debt. This tendency is especially interesting with regard to exit strategies 
employed by investors. Under German law real estate loans regularly come with special rights of Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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the owner, in particular the right of forced administration (Zwangsverwaltung) – if the holder of the 
right is a bank institutional receivership forced administration (Institutszwangsverwaltung) and sale 
by court order (Zwangsversteigerung). This is not applicable for corporate financing and especially 
the judicial sale (Zwangsversteigerung) of companies is a new and highly problematic instrument. 
It is also interesting to have a look at who is determining the market and whether there will be any 
changes in the foreseeable future. In those transactions that are publicly known the main players 
acting on the seller’s side are still mostly private banks, e.g. Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank, but 
also mortgage banks and – but only few – public banks (saving banks), e.g. BayernLB. The 
insufficient representation of public banks is surprising as a great part of Germany’s existing non-
performing loans is reckoned to exist in the scope of saving banks organisations. On the other 
hand, there are numerous reasons that make the transfer of distressed loans by saving banks seem 
problematic. Saving banks normally work locally and fulfil a regional political obligation to 
financially support economic development. Loan sales could have a negative effect on future 
business. Therefore, it remains to be seen what effects the platform – created by the S-
Finanzgruppe (NordLB, WestLB, Shinsei Bank and JC Flowers) – that pools transactions of this 
sector of the German banking market will have in the near future. 
First, the buyers were foreign investors (so-called “opportunity fonds”) as well as investment 
banks, but then also domestic players discovered the market. Also interesting is the investors’ 
tendency to use a banking licence for carrying out their transactions. E.g. Cerberus acquired the 
Handelskreditbank in 2004 and Lone Star took over the MHB Bank in spring 2005. In December 
2005 Lone Star then acquired the majority of Allgemeine Hypothekenbank Rheinboden (AHBR) 
from the holding company of the unions and thus ended the year 2005 on a spectacular high-note. 
The acquisition of banks by leading investors shows that servicing of non-performing loans 
without a banking licence leads to numerous problems. But this is not a matter of banking 
regulations or a problem originating in the areas of banking secrecy or data protection but these are 
practical operating problems, e.g. granting of a new credit and legal advantages, e.g. the option of 
institutional forced administration in the case of real estate financing. 
But despite the big wave non-performing loans have created, a sellers’ market (still) exists in 
Germany. Numerous prospective buyers are competing in auctions for portfolios, baskets and 
single names. This means that sellers – despite the pressure they are under to sell – have the chance 
to achieve an attractive price.  On the other hand, prospective buyers are increasingly burdened by 
high breakage costs of deals pursued but not done,, especially in the case of auctions. 
Also, the German Government “did its homework” and in June 2005 – shortly before the election 
campaign – smoothed out significant obstacles in the area of NPL-transaction refinancing by 
passing the Law on the New Regulation of the Federal Finance Administration and on the creation 
of a Refinancing Register. It remains to be seen whether – apart from the few transactions that have 
become publicly known (Volkswagen Bank) – this reform in association with the True Sale-
International Initiative (initiated by the KfW and other commercial banks) will make Germany 
more attractive with respect to securitisations. Overall, the German legal system makes the 
investment in non-performing loans more attractive: Even if it comes to the – from the investors’ Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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point of view – unattractive “exit-version”, i.e. enforcement of judgement (Zwangsvollstreckung), 
realisation is still possible within a reasonable time-frame. 
The „take-off“ of servicing is maybe one of the most interesting phenomena that has recently 
happened on the German distressed debt market. In the past the banks’ work-out operations only 
attracted comparably little attention. This changed due to the emergence of special servicers, e.g. 
Hudson Advisors (Lone-Star Group) or Servicing Advisors Deutschland (Citigroup, Eurohypo, 
GMAC). Hence investors acquiring non-performing loans are assuming that their main chance to 
receive the rate of return lies in servicing. They are assuming that their highly qualified servicers as 
well as – if need be – the acquisition of specialised know-how (keyword: outsourcing) will lead 
them to the same rate of return that they were able to provide their investors (especially American 
pension funds like Ontario Teachers or California Fireworkers Pension Fund) with in the past. 
Accordingly, the success of servicing is the key to success for the German non-performing loans 
market and one will surely be able to draw conclusions from the year 2006 as to how the 
performance of the great transactions of 2004 and 2005 is to be interpreted. But the market is also 
changing in relation to exit-perspectives. Although “more traditional” work-out alternatives are 
still the main focus of the investors and are being enhanced accordingly by the servicers, at the 
same time in the area of corporate loans new exit-strategies are being developed (keyword: 
securitization), which already promise an exciting year 2006 for this market. 
As an overall observation it can be said that the trade with non-performing loans and distressed 
debt investing present a special variety of private equity activity in Germany. The existing market 
is currently very interesting for foreign investors – but also domestic players – last but not least 
because of the overall attractive refinancing conditions on the capital market. 
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3.  Distressed Debt in Germany: What´s next? Possible Innovative Exit 
 Strategies (Robert A. Dickler) 
3.1   Introduction
1 
In Germany during the past two years, globally operating private equity investors have acquired 
large portfolios of non-performing loans (NPL) from major domestic banks.
2 A number of the key 
players on the buy side of the NPL transactions are funds which have gained experience in 
investing in the distressed debt markets of Asia and Latin America. Athough their expertise is in 
distressed debt, their narrower focus in Germany is on NPL’s. This is dictated by the institutional 
and legal framework, not by strategic choice. 
NPL’s are exposures to borrowers who have breached the loan contracts. Under German banking 
law, banks may disclose information about such a borrower to potential buyers of a loan portfolio.
3 
For credit market participants, the meaning of the asset category “distressed debt” is more 
inclusive than simply NPL’s. It also includes borrowers which a bank deems highly likely to 
default within a year. However, current German banking law prohibits disclosure of information on 
borrowers of distressed loans when payments of principal and interest are current and the 
willingness to meet future debt servicing requirements is not in doubt. Consequently, the distressed 
debt market in Germany is currently limited to NPL’s. 
The institutional private equity investors, which recently have acquired portfolios of NPL’s in 
Germany generally deal with these assets the way they deal with any investment. Before 
committing capital to the purchase of assets, clear exit strategies must be defined.
4 In the case of 
NPL’s, most of which are secured by real estate or other collateral, the strategic exit options are: 
(1)  Fix it: Restructuring a company‘s operations, capital assets and its capital structure; 
change of management. 
(2)  Sell it: Sale of debt or sale of equity obtained in debt/equity swap 
                                                 
1 The author thanks the Österreichische Nationalbank Jubiläumsfonds for a grant to carry out applied research in the 
project „The Time Dimension of Credit Risk“at the IMADEC University School of Business, Vienna, Austria. The 
author bears sole responsibility for the content of the Working Paper. Parts of the paper were presented at the 
Forschungskolloquium der Hochschule für Bankwirtschaft on December 15, 2005. The author thanks Professor Dr. 
Christoph Schalast, Head of the Research Area “Non-Performing Loans” and Professor Paul-Günther Schmidt, Head 
of the Center for Financial Economics, for their kind invitation to make a presentation to the colloquium. 
2 Schalast (2005) in Jobe/Stachuletz (2005), pp. VI-XI. Gleumes (2005) in op.cit., pp. 349-386. 
3 Fischer/Zuleger(2005) in op. cit. , pp. 411-436.  
4 Moyer (2005) provides a definitive discussion of the strategic nature of distressed debt investing. The most 
successful practitioner of such investing is the founder of Appaloosa Management and former senior portfolio 
manager for high yield debt at Goldman Sachs, David A. Tepper. See Grimm (2004). Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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(3)  Shut “it” down: Liquidation of the company’s assets. More precisely, in the present 
context, bankruptcy, reorganization and formation of a new entity or liquidation of 
the old entity.  
The first option aims to increase the going concern value of the enterprise in order to improve its 
debt servicing capacity. Investors in the NPL fund gain from higher recovery rate on the loan than 
would occur if the firm were to go bankrupt and be liquidated by court administrator, which is the 
most likely scenario if the loan had not been sold by the domestic bank which originated it and 
subsequently took write-offs. The portfolio managers of the fund are presumed to be turnaround 
specialists. The first strategy may be labeled “Fix it”. 
The second exit strategy focuses on the search for a strategic or financial investor who is willing 
and able to buy the debt claims or equity interests. The value added by the portfolio manager is 
more akin to a mergers and acquisitions specialist who matches buyers and sellers of companies. 
This strategy places more emphasis on enterprise value redistribution than on enterprise value 
creation. The owner’s stake is usually diluted. The private equity funds which acquire the loans 
may exit by selling NPL debt with “equity kickers” which offer investors upside potential of a firm 
which may possibly be highly solvent but temporarily illiquid. Or the debt may be converted into 
equity held by the fund and then sold. The recapitalization increases debt capacity and enables the 
company to reduce illiquidity. A variant of this scenario is the sale of the equity stake acquired in 
the debt/equity swap by the fund. Under such circumstances the recovery rate can well exceed the 
face value of the loan. The action characterizing the second exit strategy is simply “Sell it”. 
Third, the fund may make a strategic choice to liquidate the company’s assets. The aim is to realize 
as much value as possible from the sale of the security that has been offered as collateral for the 
loan. Transactions costs of this strategy may be significantly higher than the other two options, 
thereby limiting recovery rates. In addition significantly higher costs of financial distress are 
incurred in liquidation. Not only the cost of bankruptcy proceedings, but also the reduced proceeds 
from distressed sale (“fire sales”) are to be counted as additional costs of this strategy. Such an exit 
strategy may nevertheless be attractive if the fund has entered the NPL market during a recession 
and is exiting via liquidation during a strong upswing. The appreciation of the collateral during a 
cyclical upswing offers the chance of improving the recovery rate and therefore adding value for 
the fund’s investors. Here the timing and selection skills of a trading specialist and the search 
skills of a broker are decisive. The third exit strategy is tantamount to discontinuation of operations 
of the borrower as a legal entity and, from the standpoint of the distressed debt fund, might be 
termed “Shut it down”, even if the asset is utilized by a new owner, since “it” (the old firm) no 
longer exists as a legal entity. 
Are these the only options from the standpoint of the funds which invest in portfolios of NPL’s? 
The pupose of this paper is to present arguments and provide evidence to support the hypothesis 
that there are alternative innovative NPL exit strategies in Germany. The paper is necessarily 
exploratory in nature. Much work is still required for a rigorous analytical defense of the ideas 
sketched in a preliminary fashion in what follows. The aim is to consider plausible arguments for 
the feasibily and efficiency of  credit risk transfer by means of synthetic sector-specific Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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collateralized debt obligations (CDO) of non-performing loans (NPL) of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) as a possible innovative exit strategy.
5 
The innovative exit strategy is designated “Triple Play”.
6 Three novel distinguishing features of the 
strategy are: (a) the type of CDO is partially funded synthetic not True Sale; (b) the obligors of the 
underlying loans are sector-specific SME’s not a sectorally diversified portfolio of corporates; (c) 
the asset quality of the loans is speculative grade, not investment grade. Such a credit risk transfer 
may be viewed as an exit strategy, because the fund hedges recovery risk in the capital market or 
private placement market. The issuer of the SME NPL CDO is a special purpose entity called a 
“Sector Focus Fund” (SFF). A central theme of the paper is the claim that key factors which 
enhances the chances for success of the “Triple Play” are the reputation and quality of asset 
managers with specialized sector (industry) expertise. The design of the SFF structure assures that 
it manages the credit risk of the portfolio, but transfers part of the recovery risk to investors. The 
degree of “exit” is deliberately limited to the exposure to recovery rates that the SFF portfolio 
managers deem below the most likely potential rates. The SFF still has a strong incentive and, 
presumably, the ability to achieve very high recovery rates. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part 3.1 elaborates briefly three theses and three 
insights which motivate the following discussion of synthetic securitization. Part 3.2 focuses on 
trends in credit risk transfer. Part 3.3 reviews briefly the Harvard Business school case study of the 
securitization of NPL’s in Korea (KAMCO) and highlights the key lesson learned from that well-
documented experience in which the Deutsche Bank played a decisive role. Part 3.4 surveys the 
new impulses for a wave of credit risk transfer innovations. Part 3.5 outlines the SFF structure to 
implement the “Triple Play” strategy and assesses feasibility and efficiency of the transaction. Part 
3.6 concludes the paper by considering the outlook for meeting the challenges to overcome the 




                                                 
5 Stachuletz/Vyazovtsev (2005), in Jobe/Stachuletz (2005), pp. 388-410 analyze economic capital requirements of 
synthetic securitization as an instrument of loan securitization, but do not extensively discuss whether it is a likely 
exit strategy for NPL investment funds in Germany.  
6 The basic idea for the instruments and the structure is derived from the insightful discussion of „reduced loss credit 
default options“ by Tavakoli (2001), pp.184-186 and Tavakoli (2003), pp 100-4. Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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3.2   Three Theses and Three Insights on Credit Risk Transfer 
Credit risk transfer may be achieved through “true sale” of the debt claims or through the use of 
credit derivatives.
7 When the latter path is taken, it is referred to as a synthetic securitization. When 
the securitization is structured to facilitate different degrees of credit risk exposure to different 
tranches available to investors, the instrument is referred to as a collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO).
8 The origninal debt claims serve as collateral for the securities issued to facilitate credit 
risk transfer. 
Thesis 1: Partially funded synthetic SME NPL CDO 
Despite the setbacks from Basel II treatment of regulatory capital relief from credit derivatives, 
partially funded synthetic securitization of industry sector-specific portfolios of non-performing 
small and medium-sized enterprise loans by means of collateralized debt obligations is possible 
within the next 2 years. 
As will be elaborated upon below, the Revised Framework
9  places significant burdens on the 
market development of synthetic securitization of credit risk by means of credit derivatives. The 
likely response to the additional regulatory burden of banks will be increased participation in credit 
markets by non-bank institutional investors, private equity funds and hedge funds with appropriate 
ratings. If the “regulatory dialectic” hypothesis
10 and the experience of Basel I are reliable guides 
to the future, then the likely response to the excessive regulatory capital charge for synthetic 
securitizations is financial innovation in credit risk transfer to tap non-bank sources of risk 
assumption and economic capital. 
Insight 1 for investors 
The first loss position of investors in the SME NPL CDO is a “recovery call option”  
Although first-loss positions in CDO’s are referred to as “equity tranches”, such claims may also 
be viewed as call options on the residual asset value of the loan portfolio after the priority claims of 
                                                 
7 Oesterreichische Nationalbank (2004), pp.12-14; JPMorgan (2000) for introductory treatment of credit default swaps 
and options. Succinct and useful introductory overview to credit derivatives is given in Hartmann-
Wendel/Pfingsten/Weber(2004), pp. 309-318; applications to risk management are provided in Teil M4.2.2. 
“Methoden des aktiven Kreditrisikomanagements”, pp. 597-602. Applicatons of credit derivatives to credit portfolio 
management are also concisely explained in Smithson (2003). For a fixed income portfolio management perspective 
on credit risk management, Credit Suisse First Boston (2004). An overview of synthetic securitization and structured 
portfolio credit derivative market developments is given in Hawkins (2004) of Merrill Lynch in Gregory (2004), pp. 
169-192. The integration of credit derivatives and securitization in synthetic CDO’s is discussed by Choudhry 
(2004) in Gregory (2004), pp. 193-235. 
8 Duffie/Singleton (2003), Chapter 11. Heidorn/König (2003); Bluhm (2003); Felsenheimer /Gisdakis/Zaiser (2006), 
pp.443-467. 
9 Basel Committee on Banking Supervison (2005). 
10 Kane (1977) and Kane (1981). Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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the more senior tranches have been met. In the proposed SME NPL CDO the “hybrid security” 
owns a contingent claim on the excess spread of the Sector Focus Fund. 
Thesis 2: Gains from division of knowledge 
Financial innovation (recovery swaps and options, recovery data bases), Regulatory Capital 
Arbitrage and monitoring reputation are the probable key drivers of the emergence of specialist 
sector-focused funds of credit derivatives of NPLs. 
Modern portfolio theory and contemporary credit portfolio management emphasize the gains in 
efficiency from diversification. Other things being equal, more diversification reduces risk per unit 
return. Recent theoretical
11 and empirical
12 studies in the microeconomics of banking lend support 
to the view that under certain conditions (e.g. depending on size and expertise of bank) 
specialization may enable banks to reduce credit losses. In banking, what Hayek termed “division 
of knowledge” takes the form of the reduction of information asymmetry in the lender-borrower 
relationship. As in the private equity and venture capital markets, the specialization often takes the 
form of sector-specific expertise. Recovery data bases are thus necessarily structured along sectoral 
lines. If the gains from specialization exceed the costs in terms of reduced diversification effects, 
the Regulatory Capital Arbitrage triggered by the excessive capital charges for hedged NPL credit 
exposures will consequently take the sectoral path of least information asymmetry. 
 
Insight 2 for portfolio managers 
Credit Recovery Swaps and Credit Recovery Options hedge recovery risk. 
Until recently modeling of credit risk focused on probability of default. Most models that will be 
subject to supervisory review under Pillar 2 of Basel II assume that the loss given default is a non-
stochastic, i.e. deterministic variable whose value is known with certainty either by the supervisor 
or by the bank. The recent emergence of marketable credit recovery swaps
13 suggests that portfolio 
managers are seizing opportunities for hedging the recovery rates presumed in internal credit 
models. Furthermore, purchasing a “guarantee” for a certain recovery rate would be the equivalent 
of taking a long position on a put option which would pay off to the protection buyer if the 
recovery rate fell short of the exercise recovery rate (“shortfall” scenario) but would not be 
exercised if the recovery rate was at or above the recovery rate (“no shortfall” scenario) used for 
pricing the loan and allocating economic capital. 
                                                 
11 Winton (1999) and Winton (2004) and in this spirit the valuable paper by Stomper (2004).  
12 Hayden/Porath/Westernhagen (2006) for German banks. The importance of industry sector-specific risk factors in 
influencing credit losses is extensively explored in Heitfield/Burton/Chomsisengphet(2005) for the USA using 
nationally syndicated loans for the 30 largest syndicated loan lenders. 
13 Berd (2005). The author correctly points out that the contract is more appropriately termed a recovery forward rate 
agreement, but the market convention refers to credit recovery swap. A limited guarantee of a recovery rate is 
effectively a put option contract (credit recovery option), but there is no active trading in such instruments.  Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Thesis 3: Demonstration effects 
If a market for sector-specific synthetic securitizations of SME NPLs emerges successfully, it 
would raise the likelihood for liberalization to ease transfer of credit risk of performing SME loans. 
As noted above, bank secrecy rules codified in current banking laws and regulations in Germany 
constrain the transfer of performing loans of distressed debtors. The history of the evolution of 
capital markets shows that learning processes lead to institutional changes, such as the changes 
which permitted synthetic securitization of loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
Japan, Switzerland and Germany, particularly KfW’s pioneering and highly successful PROMISE 
platform
14 for credit risk transfer from major banks to private equity investors Germany. The 
improvement in credit market efficiency achievable by distributing credit risk of non-performing 
loans to non-bank investors by means of credit derivatives could result in increasing pressures from 
investors and banks for liberalization of the legal framework. In addition, if the oft-cited threat of 
financially destabilizing expansion of credit derivatives is shown under stress situations to be 
illusory, then the demonstrated improvement of social welfare and economic value from more 
efficient and possibly more stable credit markets would imply that the regulatory burden of 
institutional constraints is socially and politically unacceptable. 
Insight 3 for the general public 
Where appropriate, prudent use of credit derivatives can create economic value and improve social 
welfare. 
Financial stability is a legitimate major concern of financial market supervisors and regulators. 
Central bankers and macroeconomists have long been aware of the negative influence of financial 
instability on the performance of the economy. According to one prominent central banker
15, the 
reduction of volatility of output, the containment of inflation and the achievement of sustained high 
levels of employment in the USA over the past 15 years may be explained in part by greater 
financial stability in the banking system. He cites the rapid expansion of credit risk management 




                                                 
14 Bank for International Settlements, Committeee on the Global Financial System (2003), pp. 50-52. 
15 Greenspan (2005). Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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3.3   Trends in Credit Risk Transfer 
The rapid development of credit risk transfer has been stimulated by innovation. However, the 
future of credit risk transfer is likely to be retarded by regulation, unless further innovation occurs. 
Despite the favorable experience in the USA with credit derivatives, the Basel II framework for 
securitization reflects the dominance of both warranted and possibly unwarranted concerns about 
financial instability over chances for improved efficiency. 
3.3.1  Emergence of Synthetic Securitization 
As noted in the 75
th Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements, the notional amounts 
of credit default swaps contracts increased 6-fold between 2001 and 2004 to USD 4.5 trillion. 
Collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s), which also facilitate credit risk transfer, are expected to 
grow 10-fold from 2001 to 2006 (Figure 1). Synthetic securitization is clearly the most rapidly 




CDO Issuance  













Source: BIS Annual Report; Stachuletz/Vyazovtsev; author's own estimates
 
by the search for yield by investors and the use of instruments by financial institutions to more 
efficiently hedge and manage risk. 
Higher yields on relatively low risk CDO tranches can be obtained if correlations among defaults 
of underlying loans are high. Figure 2 shows that the cumulative probability of a low loss for the 
                                                 
16 BIS(2005), p. 116. Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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equity tranche (“Junior”) is significantly lower for loss distributions with high default correlations 
for the borrowers compared to a portfolio with low default corrleation. This implies lower risk for 
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On the other hand, the fat tail of the senior tranche of the high correlation pools offers the investors 
which are least exposed to default risk a higher yield due to the increased amount of credit risk 
exposure. The search for yield pick-up of investment grade securities thus provides a strong 
impulse for the issuance of CDOs with high correlation pools. 
As the markets focus more and more on correlation, a reallocation of risk towards the senior 
tranches of CDOs and greater willingness of equity investors to bear credit risk is likely to occur. 
This is reflected in current market pricing of the tranches of investment grade CDOs (Figure 3). 
Pools with higher default time correlation have lower upfront premiums for the “equity” tranche; 
similarly, higher correlation of such pools is associated with higher risk premium. 
3.3.2  Introduction of New Asset Classes 
The response to the search for higher correlation pools and higher risk-adjusted returns has been 
the introduction of new asset classes for securitization. For the present purposes it is noteworthy 
that loans of SME borrowers have been targeted recently by GE Commercial Finance.
17 A total of 
354 secured business loans to 305 borrowers in 42 states of the USA provided collateral for a CDO 
with a notional amount of $713 million. The structure achieved credit enhancement (risk 
mitigation) through subordination, spread accounts and expected spread. Of the six tranches, three 
were rated AAA and comprised 88% of the notional exposure. Two mezzanine tranches rated 
investment grade and accounted for 9.5%. The equity position was exposed to the first 2.5% of the 
losses on the portfolio. The ratings by Fitch emphasized the servicing experience of GECC as 
master servicer. 
While the inclusion of SME borrowers in a synthetic securitization is certainly not new to the 
German market, the GE Business Loan Trust transaction is of special interest because the there is 
no government supported entity (GSE) involved as a counterparty to the transaction. Moreover, the 
portfolio is focused on performing SME borrowers. 
Another class of assets which is obviously relevant for the present discussion is NPLs in general. It 
includes a variety of non-performing loans. Credit exposure is not only to small and medium-sized 
businesses, but also to private individuals and corporates. Consequently, the degree of 
diversification is higher, and thus the default correlations are lower. Fitch reviewed 32 NPL-
backed transactions in Italy as of June 2003 and found that they were performing well and in some 
cases exceeded expectations.
18 Credit enhancement was achieved by overcollaterization ranging 
from 16x to 2x, with an average of 4x across deals. Most noteworthy is the fact that all of the 
downgraded notes were issued by the same entity. The quality of the servicer and asset manager 
appears to be a source of default correlation. 
                                                 
17 Fitch (2005b).  
18 Fitch (2003). Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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This brief look at two new asset classes is not intended to be exhaustive. It serves to illustrate the 
evolution of market segments which may produce a mutation that initiates the emergence of the 
new asset class proposed in this paper: SME NPLs. 
3.3.3  Basel II: Capital Charges under the New Securitization Framework 
The prospects for the growth of bank and insurance companies as investors in CDOs received a 
major setback when the Basel Committee agreed to the new framework for securitization. The 
regulatory capital charges are generally viewed as excessive. There are three reasons for this 
assessment. 
First,  the substitution approach to determining the probability of default of a hedged credit 
exposure is highly restrictive. According to this procedure for determining risk-sensitized 
regulatory capital charges, the applicable probability of default is assumed to be the lower of the 
probability of defaults of the obligor or the guarantor. This approach neglects the fact that two 
events must occur before the credit exposure incurs a loss: both the default of the obligor and the 
default of the guarantor. If the two events are statistically independent, then the joint probability of 
their occurrence is the product of the probabilities. For a loan that is guaranteed by a financial 
guarantor that joint probability is very low. Usually the two events are uncorrelated. Abstracting 
from such considerations, the substitution approach of Basel II deters banks from investing in 
CDOs because the regulatory capital charge is a multiple of the economic capital required (Figure 
4). In effect, the substitution approach has been 
Figure 4 
Regulatory Capital Charges: Substitution Approach 













ASRF    Base
Case





























Counterparty 1 PD=0.1 Counterparty 2 PD=0.5
Source: Heitfield (2004), pp. 461-464 in Gregory(2004).
Source: Heitfield (2004), pp. 461-464 in Gregory(2004)
 Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
 
 
HfB – Business School of Finance & Management 









17% 0 ESF Quant Group
with excessspread








113% 0% Perraudin /Pyhktin
w/o excessspread










17% 0 ESF Quant Group
with excessspread








113% 0% Perraudin /Pyhktin
w/o excessspread





shown to be equivalent to the use of a structural portfolio model (asymptotic single risk factor) 
under the worst case scenario.
19 Second, the calculations of the ESF Quant Group in Table 1 show 
how disallowance of excess spread as a mitigant leads to a “shadow” regulatory capital that is 
nearly double the amount of economic capital.
20 Third, the impact of questionable calibration 
assumptions combined with the disallowance of the excess spread as a mitigant leads to regulatory 
capital charge (according to “shadow” regulatory calculations by Perraudin/Peretyatkin
21) which is 
6 times higher than the economic capital allocation for AA- tranche of a CDO with auto loans with 
high probability of default.  
The Basel II capital adequacy rules are intended to increase the risk sensitivity of capital allocation 
of banks. Under Basel I, the 8% capital charge for all corporate borrowers, regardless of risk rating 
led to regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA), as banks securitized high quality, low or negative margin 
corporate credits. The Basel II rules will eliminate the disincentives for holding investment grade 
corporate credits. However, it will not eliminate regulatory capital arbitrage. The regulatory capital 
charge does not apply to a portfolio of credits, but rather to each credit individually. Even after 
calibrating for default correlations in arriving at the regulatory formula, there are opportunities for 
bundling names with relatively high default correlations which enable equity tranche investors and 
super senior tranche investors to improve efficiency (risk-adjusted returns). Synthetic 
securitizations will enable banks to reduce excessive capital charges by transfering portfolios of 
credit risk to non-bank institutional investors rated at least A-. 
                                                 
19 Heitfield (2004) in Gregory (2005), pp. 451-466. 
20 Batchvarov/Picone/Hoogbruin/de Smet/Tchistiakov (2004) in Perraudin (2004), pp. 364-388. 
21 Peretyatkin/Perraudin(2004), pp.329-362.  Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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3.4   KAMCO Case Study 
The regulatory burden from the restrictive treatment of securitization under Basel II is very 
difficult, if not impossible to quantify. Theoretically, in terms of the supposed trade-off between 
stability and efficiency, the opportunitiy cost of increased financial market stability by limiting 
credit risk transfer should be measured by the loss of financial market efficiency from liberalizing 
credit risk transfer.
22 
In the distressed debt market the opportunities for synthetic securitization that may be foregone can 
be illustrated by a well-documented Harvard Business School Case Study of NPL securitization in 
South Korea.
23 The following brief sketch of the landmark Korean Asset Management Corporation 
(Korea Asset Funding 2000-1 Ltd) is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of securitizing non-
performing loans and to consider the lessons learned from its success. Moreover, from a regulatory 
perspective, the Case Study calls into question the hypothesized trade-off between stability and 
efficiency. The underlying static regulatory model ignores dynamic learning effects and thus may 
lead to a framework which unintentionally constrains both stability and efficiency by neglecting 
their possible complementarity. 
KAMCO, an NPL fund, purchased non-performing loans totalling nearly $400 million from five 
South Korean banks. It purchased protection from a domestic special purpose vehicle, Korea 1
st 
Int’l ABS Speciality Co which was funded mainly by the issuer Koreas Asset Funding 2001-1 
Limited, which took a senior position, but also in part (12%) by KAMCO, which thereby took a 
mezzanine position in exposure to the banks whose portfolios of non-performing loans it was 
managing. The first loss position was taken by the five banks which originated the loans and sold 
put options to the protection seller. If a corporate borrower failed to meet rescheduled debt service 
obligations, the option was triggered and the loan could be put back to the originating bank. If the 
bank failed to repurchase the loan, KAMCO was obligated to compensate the protection provider 
up to 12% of the face value of all the doubly defaulted obligations (borrower default on the 
restructured loan and banks default on the put options). The bulk of the funding of the SPV was 
accomplished by means of Baa2/BBB+ senior notes issued offshore in the international bond 
market. Liquidity for the structure was provided by the Korean Development Bank which was 
rated Baa/BBB+.  
Principal and interest from the loans were paid through the originators to the domestic SPV and 
passed through first to the international issuer and then to KAMCO. The management of the non-
performing loan portfolio was at the discretion of KAMCO, which had special workout expertise 
and thus received management and servicing fees. The originating banks received premia for the 
put options. The investor base consisted of over 60% distressed debt funds, over 25% banks, and 
nearly 10% insurance companies. Over half the investors were domiciled in the USA; nearly a 
third were based in Asia; the rest came from Europe, principally the UK and Ireland. 
                                                 
22 Smith and Walter (2003), pp.336-338. 
23 Chacko/Hood/Dessain/Sjöman, Harvard Business School Case Study 9-205-037 (2005) and Deutsche Bank AG 
(2002). Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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The credit enhancement structure involving put-backs offered by the loan originators and 
subordination accepted by the servicer KAMCO and liquidity facilities of an investment grade 
bank contributed to the success of this and subsequent transactions. Collateral and loan terms were 
screened before inclusion in the portfolio. In addition the industry and geography diversification 
are cited as success factors and closely related to this the favorable risk/return profile of the senior 
tranche. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, special attention should be drawn in particular to three 
key success factors: 
-  High recovery potential of the portfolio 
-  Servicer’s recovery track record 
-  Viability of business and operations of the obligors. 
It is evident that the specialization of the portfolio manager and servicer KAMCO endogenizes the 
recovery rate. The high potential recovery rate represents the feasible “output” of the workout 
operation. The servicer’s recovery track record is evidence of organizational and technological 
know-how in the “production” of loan recoveries. The viability of the business and operations of 
the obligors are the “raw materials” selected by the portfolio manager. Good portfolio managers, 
combined with specialized servicers, have the capacity to “produce” favorable results. This was the 
learning experience of KAMCO. 
Current models of loan loss distributions treat the loss given default as deterministic and constant. 
The value of this parameter is fixed either by the supervisors (Internal Ratings Based Approach – 
Fundamental) or by the historical experience of the bank (Internal Ratings Based Approach – 
Advanced). In the the latter approach, Basel II recognizes that there are differences among banks at 
a given point of time based on validated historical recovery data. 
The experience of KAMCO demonstrates that the loss given default of a given institution can 
change over time, especially if that institution is specialized in workouts and focused on raising 
recovery rates to the potentially highest level. The learning effects of special loan administration 
units dealing repeatedly with bankruptcy law, corporate law, commercial law, business 
reorganization and restructuring, turnaround situations, debt/equity conversions, collateral 
liquidations, mergers, etc. are considerable. As will be discussed below, the distribution of 
recovery rates in a country is not unimodel, but bimodal. This interesting fact requires an 
explanation. The hypothesis offered here is that a possible cause of the bimodality is the 
endogeneity of the quality of “delegated monitoring”. Some banks are good at recovery and get 
better over time; however, some are bad at it and eventually are selected out in an evolutionary 
process. Thus, one lesson to be learned from the KAMCO Case Study is: learning effects matter. 
Learning effects enter into the framework of distressed debt analysis by comparison of the loss 
distributions faced by different banks at a point in time or by considering the changes in the 
parameters of a loss distribution of a single bank over time. Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Figure 5 






































In Figure 5, the KAMCO transaction is interpreted as a shifting of the loss distribution that may be 
attributed to the greater specialization of the portfolio manager and loan servicer in loan recovery 
compared to the banks which originated the loans. 
In Figures 6a and 6b, the parameters of the loss distribution representing expected loss and 
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cumulative volume of comparably diversified portfolios under management increases. The 
contractual design of the transaction structure strongly incentives KAMCO to learn from 
experience. The positive incentive for continually improving monitoring quality is provided by the 
excess spread that arises from the significantly lower economic capital charge for unexpected 
losses of a diversified portfolio of “guaranteed” loans (which are able to be put back, to the banks) 
compared to the regulatory capital charge for individual loans orginated by the banks. Both 
borrowers and banks must fail before KAMCO is exposed to loss. The disincentive for poor 
monitoring quality is the higher risk exposure due to the mezzanine tranche’s subordination to the 
the senior tranche held by the investors. Both the ability and willingness to learn from experience 
accounts for the hypothesized intertemporal heteroscedasticity of the loss distribution. 
3.5   New Impulses for Innovation in Credit Risk Transfer  
Recent innovations in recovery risk measurement and rating are suited to accelerating the learning 
process just discussed. Research on recovery rates both at the individual issuer level and portfolio 
level carried out by rating agencies suggests that recovery risk is sector-specific. The applied 
empirical research also indicates that monitoring quality matters, i.e. that the recovery risk is not 
fully determined by exogenous factors. Furthermore advanced theoretical models for measuring 
risk and pricing portfolios of credit default swaps represent a major breakthrough for synthetic 
securitization. Finally, the development and trading of credit recovery swaps shows that 
instruments exist that separate recovery risk from the default risk. This latter development has far-
reaching implications for synthetic securitization of non-performing loans, and eventually for all 
types of distressed debt. Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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3.5.1  Issue Recovery Risk Measurement and Rating 
Three rating agencies have carried out extensive empirical research on defaulted bonds in order to 




26 have made important contributions which are intended to lay the empirical 
foundation for recovery ratings. The results of this research are not uniform. The agencies’ work is 
complementary. 
All three agencies agree that seniority (position in the capital structure) of an exposure to an issuer 
is a key explanatory factor. However, only Moody’s and Fitch appear to agree that the sector of the 
borrower significantly affects recovery.
27 Furthermore, whereas Moody’s use of KMV a structural 
model does not allow for endogeneity of the recovery rate, both S&P’s and Fitch identifiy “banks’ 
idiosyncratic factors” (S&P’s) and “asset manager quality” (Fitch) as key determinants of recovery 
rates. 
3.5.1.1  Asset Manager Quality 
How do banks differ with regard to their recovery process? In a major empirical study, Franks, 
deServigny and Davydenko
28 of S&P’s identify five “idiosyncratic factors” which affect recovery 
rates: 
-  Definition of default 
-  Collection of data at the firm and facility level 
-  Amount and type of collateral (positioning relative to other banks) 
-  Dynamic process for securing collateral during workout 
-  Accuracy and timeliness of collateral valuation. 
More specifically related to distressed debt manager quality for middle market loans, S&P’s 
emphasizes the following evaluation criteria:  
 “These managers should have a track record of obtaining recoveries on the distressed debt 
with high returns on their initial investment. Key features in distressed debt management 
include a seasoned workout team; understanding and ability to work through complex legal 
issues involved in restructurings and bankruptcies; access to capital to manage through 
                                                 
24 Gupton(2005). 
25 Franks/deServigny/Davydenko(2004). 
26 Fitch (2005c). 
27 According to Schuermann(2005), p. 19 „Industry matters – sometimes.“ The empirical studies he surveys indicate 
lack of agreement on whether the sector (referred to as “industry”) is statistically significant.  
28 Franks/deServigny/Davydenko (2004), pp. 90-93. Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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workouts that need additional cash; and an understanding of asset valuation and the 
discipline to liquidate companies when appropriate.”
29  
More closely related to assessment of synthetic securitizations, Fitch has developed CDO Asset 
Manager Ratings which assign weights the following factors
30: 
-  Experience (company, management): 15% 
-  Staffing: 10% 
-  Procedure and controls: 5% 
-  Portfolio management: 25% 
-  CDO administration: 10% 
-  Technology: 10% 
-  CDO performance: 25%  
S&P’s research on CBO Index Deals focuses on the dispersion recovery rates. For the 1999 high-
yield cohort analysed over the period October 2000 to March 2001, the findings show that the 
bottom 10 managers recovered on average about 3% whereas the top ten recovered on average 
50%. The implication of the studies by Fitch and S&P’s researchers is that the recovery rate of a 
debt issue (alternatively, loss given default) is neither completely exogenous nor invariant. It is 
influenced significantly by the quality of the delegated monitoring. 
If it is assumed that recovery rates are both exogenously and endogenously determined, then the 
question arises regarding the performance of the distressed debt manager. As argued above in the 
case of KAMCO, recovery rates achieved by the specialized unit are presumably higher than those 
typically realized by the originating banks. Investors in portfolios of non-performing loans are thus 
interested in the assessment of the performance of the portfolio, which is partly a reflection of the 
quality of the asset manager, but also dependent on factors beyond the manager’s control, such as 
which sector the firm belongs to and the phase of the business cycle. 
Recently, both Fitch
31 and S&P’s
32 introduced recovery rating scales. This area of credit analysis 
research is in its incipiency. Consequently, one may expect revisions and refinements as 
researchers and practitioners gain insights into their usefulness and limitations. A comparison 
shows that the performance, as measured by recovery rating, is scaled in a strikingly different 
manner. In Tables 2a and 2b it is seen that recovery ratings have an impact on the issue (not issuer) 
rating. 
                                                 
29 Standard&Poor’s, Structured finance (2004), p.10. 
30 Fitch (2005a). 
31 Fitch (2005a). 
32 Chew/Kerr (2005) in Altman/Resti/Sironi (2005), pp.87-97. Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Table 2a: S&P Recovery Rating Scale 
RR  R %  Notches 
1+  >100  +3 or 4 
1  100  +1 or 2 
2  80-100  0 
3  50-80  0 
4  25-50  0 
5  0-25  0 
Table 2b: Fitch Recovery Rating Scale 
RR  R %  Notches 
R1  90-100  +3 
R2  70-90  +2 
R3  50-70  +1 
R4  30-50  0 
R5  10-30  -1 








The impact is measured in notches. (For each grade there are three notches.) In the S&P scale, an 
improvement in the issue (or facility) rating of one or two notches is recognized by the Recovery 
Rating RR1 for recovery rates of 100%. A Recovery Rating of RR1+ is assigned to recoveries in 
excess of 100%. This is possible if loans are overcollateralized (loan to value ratios <1) or if 
recovery through a debt/equity swap enables the lender to realize proceeds upon sale of equity in 
excess of interest and payment due. The S&P scale does not differentiate among recovery rates 
below 1. This conservative feature implies that improved prospects of recovery do not impact the 
issue debt rating until the threshold of full recovery is reached. Consequently, the current S&P 
recovery rating scheme is not fully aligned with the debt market’s debt pricing practice. Bond 
prices and secondary loan market prices respond to information that is relevant to the formation of 
recovery expectations that are below full recovery. 
The Fitch rating schema adresses this issue. An average recovery rate ranging between 30% and 
50% is assumed to have no impact on issue rating. However, poor recovery rates between 0% and 
10% (R6) can lead to a full grade (up to 3 notches) penality, whereas high recovery rates between 
90% and 100% (R1) can lead to at most a full grade (3 notches) improvement. The weakness of the 
Fitch scheme serves to highlight the strength of the S&P approach. Unlike S&P, Fitch does not 
explicitly take into account the fact that recovery in excess of face value is also a realistic prospect 
in distressed debt portfolios in which the managers make extensive use of debt/equity swaps, or Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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loans are overcollateralized. Clearly, the approaches are complementary. Nevertheless, it appears 
that the Fitch scale is more aligned with distressed debt pricing practice. 
3.5.1.2  Sector  
Before taking a closer look at the factors which Fitch takes into account in order to arrive at a 
differentiated recovery rating, it is necessary to highlight another distinguishing feature of their 
approach: the critical role played by the sector in which the borrower is engaged. In the recent 
discussions of recovery risk, “sector” refers to broad industry groupings. Unfortunately, the rating 
agencies have not yet agreed to a uniform classification of sectors
33, but there is fairly close 
agreement and convergence in classification schemes may be expected. The most extensive 
empirical investigation of recovery rates of defaulted bonds by sector was carried out by Hagmann, 
Renault and Scaillet of S&P’s using a 12 sector classification scheme of S&P’s LossStat slighlty 
different from the 11 sector scheme recently agreed upon by S&P’s with the Citigroup. The results 
are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Recovery Rate Means and Standard Deviations: S&P LossStat Data Base 




Utility  55  68.37  20.82 
Insurance/Real estate  33  39.79  26.70 
Telecommunications  14  24.73  7.53 
Transportation  39  37.52  27.12 
Financial services  24  29.70  24.63 
Health care/Chemicals  22  36.51  26.33 
High Technology  14  50.46  22.15 
Aerospace/Automotive  79  42.98  21.36 
Forest/Building  43  39.69  29.46 
Leisure/Media  155  36.80  21.21 
Consumer/Services  86  42.91  27.06 
Energy/Natural resources  59  45.56  25.62 
*Defined as „industry by authors” Source: Hagmann, Renault, Scaillet (2005), p.332. 
                                                 
33 S&P’s GICS® is emerging as an evolving industry standard (see Standard & Poor’s (2005)), but the Pan European 
Credit Data Consortium, which is cooperating with Fitch through Algorithmics,  may use slightly different 
classifications.  Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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In view of the range in recovery rates from about 25% for telecommunications to over 67% for 
utilities, this table might appear to contradict the finding cited above and reported by S&P’s that 
“industry” is an “irrelevant” factor in the explanation of recovery rates. Note, however, if “normal” 
rates are, as Fitch suggests, in the range between 30% and 50%, then 10 out of 12 sectors do not 
exhibit abnormal recovery rates. This lack of extreme variability may be regarded as roughly 
consistent with the S&P finding. On the other hand, the high standard deviations (except for 
telecommunications) suggest, but do not prove, that there is signficant latitude for “endogeneity” 
of recovery. 
Empirical studies of recovery rates do not answer the question of how the “sector” might enter into 
recovery rate calculations of lenders and investors in distressed debt markets. The clearest answer 
to this question has been provided by Fitch in a series of recent publications on their recovery 
rating criteria.
34 The basic insight is that the sector is relevant for valuation of the enterprise. 
Valuation is the starting point for assessment of recovery prospects. 
The Fitch recovery rating procedure consists of three steps: 
-  Step 1: Valuation - Estimate of Enterprise value using going concern and liquidation values 
(whichever is lower) 
-  Step 2: Distribution Value: Estimate of Creditor Mass 
-  Step 3: Prioritization: Distribution of Value among claims. 
The  going conern valuation focuses on current estimates of Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA). Using the North American Credit Data Consortium 
data base, valuation factors are selected by analysts to arrive at enterprise going concern valuation. 
(Since October, 2005, Fitch, together with its subsidiary Algorithmics, Inc. and major global banks 
with operations in Europe, is currently working with the Pan European Credit Data Consortium—a 
recovery rate data pool-- to put together a similar European data bank.
35) First, estimated EBITDA 
is discounted, to obtain  distressed EBITDA, reflecting the impact of financial distress on cash 
generating ability. The analyst must assess how supportive non-financial and financial stakeholders 
are in efforts to achieve financial stability. Here behavioral finance issues, such as suppliers’ 
demand for advance payments (Vorkasse) or risk premia (Risikoaufschläge) , customers’demand 
for discounts (Risikoabschläge), etc. are investigated. These factors may change over time 
depending upon the degree of cooperation or confrontation among all financial and non-financial 
stakeholders. 
 
                                                 
34 Fitch (2005c) for an elaboration of the procedure that is applied in the following discussion. Separate criteria reports 
have been issued by Fitch for the sectors. The Appendix to this Working Paper briefly summarizes the application in 
Fitch (2005d) to Delphi Corp, the financially distressed US auto parts supplier in which David A. Tepper’s 
Appaloosa Management Ltd. holds a 9.3% equity interest. 
35 Algorithmics (2005).  Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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 Table 4: Discounts Applied to EBITDA (% Reduction of EBITDA) 
Sector  Low  High  Average 
Aerospace and Diversified  23  40  31 
Auto Parts  20  45  20 
Homebuilders  35  35  35 
Chemicals/Health Care  11  75  46 
Consumer  31  31  31 
Energy/Commodities  25  25  25 
Food and Beverage  30  30  30 
Technology, Media & Business Services  20  80  45 
Retail  15  40  28 
Telecom/Cable  20  65  36 
Airlines and Gaming  13  16  13 
Note: Based on North American data; may vary by jurisdiction Source: Fitch (2005b), p.4 
Second, an Enterprise Value  EBITDA multiple  (Enterprise Value expressed as a multiple of 
EBITDA ) is selected which reflects the analyst’s view of business position (20% weight), 
financial flexibility (40% weight) and operating environment (40% weight). A scorecard which is 
based on conventional financial analysis arrives at a qualitative measure of strength ranging from 
relatively weak, medium, and relatively strong. The score obtained from the conventional financial 
analysis drives the selection (“look-up”) of the appropriate Enterprise Value EBITDA multiple 
obtained from the  sectoral  Enterprise Value EBITDA multiple data base. The sector-specific 
Enterprise Value EBITDA multiples for North America are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Enterprise Value Multiples (x EBITDA) 
Sector  Low  High  Medium 
Chemicals/Health Care  6.0x  9.0x  7.0x 
Telecom/Cable  4.5x  8.5x  7.0x 
Technology, Media and Business Services  4.0x  8.0x  6.3x 
Food and Beverage  7.0x  7.0x  7.0x 
Aerospace and Diversified  6.0x  7.0x  6.6x 
Retail  5.1x  6.2x  5.8x 
Energy/Commodities  6.0x  6.0x  6.0x 
Auto Parts  4.8x  5.0x  4.9x 
Consumer  5.0x  5.0x  5.0x 
Airlines and Gaming  4.5x  5.0x  4.9x 
Building Products  4.0x  4.0x  4.0x 
Note: Based on North American data; may vary by jurisdiction Source: Fitch (2005b), p. 4 Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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The valuation procedure also considers liquidation value. The data base is structured to provide 
balance sheet information that is differentiated by sector. Average liquidation value haircut 
histories (% of book value realized) of accounts receivable, inventory and property, plant and 
equipment are used to estimate highs and lows that have been experienced in the specific sectors. 
For all sectors average accounts receivables range between a low of 66% and a high of 80%; 
inventory low liquidation value averages 50% whereas the high mean value is 60%; property plant 
and equipment averagers range beteen 39% and 53% percent. These averages mask high variability 
across the sectors for each asset category. 
Enterprise value is determined either as going concern value or liquidation value, whichever is 
lower. To obtain going concern enterprise value, the discounted EBITDA is multiplied by the 
Enterprise Value EBITDA multiple. For unlisted companies, this “rule of thumb” for valuation is a 
pragmatic substitute for market value of debt and equity to obtain going concern value. The 
enterprise liquidation value of operating assets is obtained by finding the sum of the estimated 
proceeds from liquidating accounts receivables, inventory, property plant and equipment using the 
haircuts provided by the sector specific data base. 
The second step in the recovery rating process is designated determination of creditor mass, which 
Fitch refers to as “Distribution Value”. This step is necessary to deduct administrative and priority 
claims as well as estimated collaborative payments to subordinated debt holders in order to get 
agreement to a reorganization or restructuring plan. These considerations are theoretically and 
practically well-founded, even if the implementation requires subjective judgements. On the one 
hand, expected costs of financial distress consist of the inevitable transactions costs of restructuring 
and reorganization. On the other hand, the outcome of the strategic interaction among different 
classes of creditors (senior, junior) to coordinate their demands through intercreditor negotiations, 
in order a avoid prisoner’s dilemma outcome, ultimately determines what is available to the senior 
debt holders. 
The third step in the procedure is prioritization. The Distribution Value is allocated in accordance 
with seniority level, as would be usual under a specific jurisdictions bankrupcy administration. All 
claims in the same category are treated equally, i.e. pari passu. 
The assignment of recovery ratings is then carried out by determining the the fraction of the 
nominal value of the claim that has been allocated to the liability type. The resulting percentage is 
then linked to the rating scale. 
In Table 6, the empirical frequency distributions of typical recovery rates by seniority class 
(liability type) are shown on each line. The top line of the table  
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Table 6: Distributions of Recovery Rates by Seniority and Recovery Rating  
Midpoint Recovery  95  80  60  40  15  5 




Asset Based  100  0  0  0  0  0  95 
Secured Bank  90  0  7  3  0  0  91 
Secured Bond  34  30  27  8  0  1  76 
Unsecured  9  4  25  28  12  22  41 
Subordinated  5  0  23  3  22  47  26 
Preferred Stock  0  0  0  0  0  100  5 
Aggregate  39  5  19  16  7  13  60 
Source: Fitch (2005c), p.7. Note: Based on North American data base 
shows recovery rate mid-point that corresponds to the recovery rating class. While it appears that 
one could short-cut the entire procedure by simply looking at the liability class, this is only true for 
asset based and preferred stock; it is approximately correct for secured senior bank debt. The three 
step procedure outlined above is necessary to allocate value to the claimants and then compare the 
result to the nominal value of the claims. Nevertheless there appears to be a very rough 
correspondence between the rating scale and the average recovery rates by seniority types “asset 
based” (RR 1) “senior secured” (combined group RR2 and RR3), “senior unsecured” (RR4) and 
“subordinated” (RR5), and finally “preferred stock” (RR 6). 
The difference between such a short-cut, ad hoc approach and the value-based procedure leading to 
an assignment according to the midpoints on top line in Table 6 is decisive. Whereas the liability 
classification is relatively static and fixed, the valuations which drive the mass of claims to be 
distributed are dynamic and can change significantly in the course of a workout. More importantly, 
for the categories “senior bond”, “unsecured” und “subordinated”, the empirical frequency 
distribution of recoveries among rating classes is highly dispersed. Finally, for the critical category 
“senior secured bank debt”, the distribution is bimodal, with “fat tails” at very high and mid-range 
recovery rates. A value-based derivation of recovery rates determined as allocated claim as a per 
cent of nominal value of claim is fundamentally important for systematic assessment of the 
expected rate of recovery. The expected recovery rate is not only conditional upon seniority 
position but also on key drivers which determine enterprise value. As the Fitch three-step 
procedure demonstrates, among the key drivers of the recovery rate is the sector to which the debt 
issuer belongs through its impact on valuation. 
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3.5.2  Portfolio Recovery Risk Measurement and Rating 
The preceding discussion treated the measurement and rating of recovery at the individual debt 
issuer level. Recovery ratings of issues represent an important innovation which will provide a 
strong impulse for the development of synthetic securitization. However important the innovation 
may be for investors which are willing to assume the credit risks of distressed debt, the impact of 
the innovation will be strongly reinforced by new theoretical advances in pricing and rating risks of 
portfolios of loans and credit derivatives. As was shown in the KAMCO case study, the NPL 
securitization market can emerge only if the risks of portfolios of loans and the tranches of the 
instruments (credit derivatives) issued can be assessed and priced. 
Two recent breakthroughs in analysis of collateralized debt obligations (CDO’) have been achieved 
by academic researchers. Academic research on CDO’s is proceeding at an extraordinarily rapid 
pace, and thus the work mentioned here is only intended to be indicative. The short review of the 
work in this area is meant to illustrate the thesis that practitioners must watch the progress in the 
theoretical applied research and development on the credit derivative instruments required for 
synthetic securitization of non-performing loans. Of course, one should add that academic 
researchers should also watch the breakthroughs that are being achieved by “practitioners” in the 
research and development departments of central banks, rating agencies and financial institutions. 
In this area of financial engineering research and development, distinctions between “academics” 
and “practitioners” are blurred. One can plausibly argue that many academics still need to catch up 
to the advanced “practitioners”.
36 
In a landmark unpublished working paper, Hull, Predescu and White
37 apply option pricing theory 
in a structural model to assess both the portfolio risk, tranche risks and the risks of individual 
issuers whose issues make up a portfolio consisting of the 5 year Dow-Jones credit derivative CDX 
Index of Investment Grade Corporates. The riskiness of the portfolio depends on the price 
volatilities and asset correlations of the underlying credit derivatives. The risks of the tranches 
depend on the degree of protection offered by the attachment points. Table 7a summarizes the 
findings for pricing which is dependent upon the risk. The authors find that: 
                                                 
36 For example the breakthrough by Pykhtin (2004) in Perraudin (2004), previously of Key Corp and currently at BoA 
in deriving closed form expression for economic capital for securitizations. 
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Table 7a Hull, Predescu and White (2005)  
 
 
5-YEAR DJ CDX Investment Grade North America 
Structural Model Prices (bp) 





3-7%  7-10%  10-15%  15-30% 
0  59.2%  232  0.4  0  0 
0.1  46.2%  376  67  11  0.3 
0.2  37.1%  408  135  46  5 
0.3  29.4%  407  176  81  16 
0.4  22.5%  393  199  110  31 
0.5  16.1%  369  211  130  48 







































0  3.25  0.00  0.00  93.2  16.2  0.0 
10  3.24  0.40  3.85  78.1  14.0  0.2 
20  2.93  0.91  11.95  60.6  10.1  0.4 
30  2.58  1.37  22.2  49.6  7.4  0.6 
 
-  the risk of the mezzanine tranche is not a monotonically rising function of correlation 
-  the risk of the first loss position declines as correlation rises 
-  the risk of the senior positions rises as monotonically as correlation increases.  
The latter results confirm an earlier study of Frey and Backhaus which models counterparty and 
borrower default risk for pricing basket default swaps.
38 Their findings are summarized in Table 
7b.  
-  Spread on first loss position falls as correlation increases 
-  Spread on senior position rises as correlation increases 
                                                 
38 Frey/Backhaus (2004) Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Although the findings for the mezzanine tranche differ, Hull et.al. define the attachment points 
more narrowly (3% to 7% compared to 3% to 10%), and they investigate higher ranges of 
correlation (40% and 50%). 
In these studies the attachment points are defined by exposure to cumulative credit losses of the 
portfolio. The pricing models for the portfolio are based on default correlations among the 
individual issuers. 
The estimation of default correlations among issuers is another area of highly intense theoretical 
and empirical research which has relevance for structuring and pricing portfolio credit risk in 
synthetic securitization transactions. Important work at S&P’s reported by de Servigny and 
Renault
39 apply copula methods to estimate conditional correlations. In Table 8 the rows and 
columns of the correlation matrix are sectors, but the cells of the matrix are average 
                                                 
39 deServigny/Renault(2004); The pioneer is Citigroup’s David X. Li, formerly of Moody’s. For pricing of tranches of 
portfolio of credit derivates based on copula function approach, Li/Skarabot (2004) in Gregory(2004), pp. 287-312 Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
 
 
HfB – Business School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 73  34 
 
Table 8: 5-Year Default Correlations, All Countries, All Ratings 1981-2002 (in %) 
  Auto  Cons  Energ  Finan  Build  Chem  Hi tec  Insur  Leis  R.E  Tele  Trans  Utility 
Auto  3.04  0.51  1.94  1.35  1.52  2.62  1.49  1.25  1.43  4.18  5.00  1.59  1.25 
Cons  0.51  2.40  -3.24  1.02  2.08  1.12  0.35  0.54  2.50  6.53  2.71  1.58  1.13 
Energ  1.94  -3.24  7.46  -0.13  -1.63  0.00  1.28  1.62  -3.13  1.11  -0.88  -0.56  -0.26 
Finan  1.35  1.02  -0.13  2.08  2.16  1.15  1.19  -0.12  3.10  7.38  1.00  1.45  1.02 
Build  1.52  2.08  -1.63  2.16  3.75  1.78  1.69  0.22  4.82  8.25  3.24  2.40  1.60 
Chem  2.62  1.12  0.00  1.15  1.78  3.46  0.54  0.38  2.02  1.65  6.18  1.35  1.19 
Hi tec  1.49  0.35  1.28  1.19  1.69  0.54  2.06  0.29  1.76  5.61  1.71  1.32  0.98 
Insur  1.25  0.54  1.62  -0.12  0.22  0.38  0.29  1.21  -0.30  -0.27  1.18  0.96  0.21 
Leis  1.43  2.50  -3.13  3.10  4.82  2.02  1.76  -.30  6.97  12.67  3.80  3.31  1.89 
R.E.  4.18  6.53  1.11  7.38  8.25  1.65  5.61  -.27  12.67  16.99  -2.01  5.49  2.98 
Tele  5.00  2.71  -0.88  1.00  3.24  6.18  1.71  1.18  3.80  -2.01  15.40  3.55  2.57 
Trans  1.59  1.58  -0.56  1.45  2.40  1.35  1.32  0.96  3.31  5.49  3.55  2.48  1.22 
Utility  1.25  1.13  -0.26  1.02  1.60  1.19  0.98  0.21  1.89  2.98  2.57  1.22  1.12 
Source: de Servigny and Renault (2004), p. 190. 
correlations of default between pairs of firms in the sectors. Consequently the diagonal elements 
are not 1, as in unconditional correlation matrices, but of course the matrix is symmetrical. The 
matrix shows the correlation of the default of pairs of issuing firms given the sector in which they 
are engaged. The diagonal of the matrix reported by de Servigny and Renault in Table 8 shows 
that firms in the same sector do not all default at the same time. Nevertheless, it is evident from 
their matrix that the joint defaults of pairs of firms is usually (but not always) highest for firms 
within the same sector. 
This result is significant for investors in portfolios of credit derivatives, such as synthetic CDO’s. 
In particular, the investors in the first loss position may be able to reduce risk while maintaining 
return by gaining exposure to a single sector. Moreover, the investors in the senior tranches may be 
able to increase returns without significantly increasing risk by focusing their exposures on specific 
sectors as well. If such increases in efficiency are possible, the demand for CDO structures which 
offer exposure to sectors can be expected to increase significantly. 
To satisfy the requirements of investors, the rating agencies have made significant advances in 
their CDO rating approaches by applying theoretical models, such as those discussed above. A 
study of the Austrian National Bank
40 provides an overview (Table 10) which facilitates a 
comparison of their methodologies for assessing the risk of portfolios of credit risk. 
                                                 
40 Oesterreichische Nationalbank (2004), p. 43. For background of the quantitative and qualitative analysis for ratings 
of tranches of synthetic CDO’s see Gilkes/Jobst (2004) in Perraudin (2004), pp. 117-139.  Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Table 10: CDO Portfolio Risk Asssessment: Application of Credit Risk Models 
Comparison of CDO Rating Approaches in Rating Agences 
   Moody’s  Fitch  S&P 
Rating statement  Expected loss  Probability of default  Probability of default 
Portfolio model  Binomial expansion 
technique (BET) 
VECTOR model  CDO EVALUATOR 
model 
Modeling approach  Portfolio level  Individual receivables level  Individual receivables 
level 
Assumed distribution  Binomial distribution 
(defaults 
Monte Carlo simulation 
(defaults, loss) 
Monte Carlo simulation 
(defaults) 
Simulation period  N/A  Multi-step  Single-step 
Correlations  Diversity score, discrete 
value (static) 




Correlation value  0.00-0.36  0.06-0.55  0.00-0.30 
Recovery rate (US)  30%-57%  24%-70%  15%-60% 
Stress test result  Is EL < limit for desired 
rating  
Is EL < limit for desired 
rating 
Is EL below limit for 
desired rating 
Source: Oesterreichische Nationalbank (2004) 
Three models are currently in use are the Binomial Expansion Model of Moody’s, the VECTOR 
model of Fitch and the CDO Evaluator model of S&P’s. The range of correlations used by Fitch is 
noticeably larger than that of Moody’s and S&P’s. Diversity scores imply a penalty for sectoral 
concentrations, since it is assumed that diversification lowers risk. This would be true if all risk 
exposures were exogenous. However, a portfolio manager’s specialized knowledge of a sector may 
be an important factor, especially in CDO’s for distressed debt. This is acknowledged by S&P’s 
CDO Rating criteria. The models that are currently in use apply to companies that are not in 
default. 
3.5.3  Recovery Swaps and Recovery Options: Forward Recovery Rates 
Can recovery risk be modeled, priced and hedged with credit derivatives? Implicitly recovery risk 
has been priced into credit derivatives which enable lenders to hedge issues of borrowers which are 
in compliance with loan agreements. Recent academic research on bond recovery models has Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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progressed rapidly. 
41 A recent market development is the emergence of a market for recovery 
swaps for issues of high grade corporate names.
42 The term “swap” is a misnomer. The structure of 
the financial instrument is clearly that of a foward. Two counterparties agree to exchange the 
realized recovery versus the preset recovery value (recovery swap rate). The protection buyer locks 
in a recovery rate on or before a specific date in the future. If the recovery rate is above the forward 
recovery rate, the protection seller’s payoff under the contract is positive. If the recovery rate is 
below the forward recovery rate, the protection buyer’s payoff is positive. Figure 7a shows the 
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41 Schönbucher (2003), Chapter 6 „Recovery Modelling“, pp. 131-163; Lando(2004), pp. 117-121 for intuitive 
arguments. For advanced modeling, see Hagmann/Renault/Scaillet (2005) in Altman/Resti/Sironi (2005), pp. 323-
346 and Friedman/Sandow (2005) in op. cit. , pp.347-359. 
42 Berd (2005); Felsenheimer/Gisdakis/Zaiser (2006): „While recovery value is directly tradable with a combination of 
CDS and DDS contracts, recovery default swaps allow investors to take directional exposure to recovery risk…As 
the contract is forward-styled and not option-styled, it will involve a negative payoff in case the recovery rate is 
below the strike level.“  op. cit. p.496. In the following reference will be made to “recovery swaps” which 
corresponds to market convention and to analagous “recovery options”.  Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Figure 7b 
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Other features and conventions of market terminology of the instrument are as follows
43: 
•  No running or upfront payments 
•  Investor: „Receiver“ of  realized recovery rate  sells protection (receives insurance 
premium, receives realized recovery rate in “swap” against preset forward recovery “swap” 
rate). Receiver of realized recovery rate suffers loss when recovery rate is zero or less than 
preset recovery swap rate and enjoys gain when recovery rate is above the preset foreword 
recovery “swap” rate, thus takes a “long position” in recovery swap. 
•  Portfolio Manager: „ Payer“ of  realized recovery rate  buys protection (pays insurance 
premium, pays zero if recovery rate is zero, receives in exchange (“swaps”) the preset 
forward recovery swap rate. The “Payer” hedges recovery shortfall losses but foregoes 





                                                 
43 Berd (2005), pp. 61-70. 
Rswap rate - Rrealized                    [t<T] 
Payoff to “Payer” =  0 [otherwise] 
 
Note: T refers to deadline for defaulted borrwer to emerge from distress Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
 
 
HfB – Business School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 73  38 
 
Figure 7b shows the payoff structure for what may be conceived as a recovery option which is 
defined analagously to the recovery swap. To the author’s knowledge, no such product is traded, 
but it is clearly closely related to a put option on the credit risk which is triggered by recovery rates 
that are at or below the forward recovery rate. It is a limited financial guarantee against a specified 
recovery rate shortfall. The advantage of a Recovery Option would be that it provides flexibility to 
the protection buyer, who is the portfolio manager (“payer” of realized recovery rate), to 
participate in recovery rates that are above the forward recovery rate without being exposed to 
recovery rates that are below the forward rate, as is the case with a short recovery rate forward 
contract. The disadvantage is that a higher premium must be paid to induce the protection seller to 
commit to take the downside risk without participating in the upside gain. Intuitively, the pricing is 
should be approximately midway between an equity default swap (bankruptcy) and a credit default 
swap (distress).
44 Unlike the recovery swap, there would be an upfront, and perhaps even running 
payments. The portfolio manager has an incentive to recover this premium through high 
performance. 
The instrument most closely resembles a financial guarantee or credit insurance, except that the 
indemnification is not in full but for the difference between the swap rate and the realized recovery 
rate applied to the nominal value of the debt contract under management. As with every insurance 
contract, there is information asymmetry about the insured party’s behavior, which gives rise to 
moral hazard. However, in sequential games in which reputation plays a decisive role, the portfolio 
manager’s performance in the current period will affect whether in future periods the risks of future 
portfolios of credit risk can be transferred on favorable terms. In the interest of maintaining a good 
reputation as a portfolio manager, transfer of credit risk of portfolios whose recovery rates are 
expected by the portfolio manager to be well below the forward recovery rate (“lemons”) will not 
take place. 
The Recovery Put Option could be employed in a collateralized debt obligation. The first loss 
position would be an equity-like exposure, i.e. a long position in a Recovery Call Option for 
recovery rates that are 0% to to 4% below the preset forward recovery “swap” rate, i.e. payoff only 
for recovery rates between 26% and 30%. The mezzanine position would be exposed to the next 
highest credit risk exposure of recovery rates from 4% to 20% below the preset forward recovery 
“swap” rate, i.e. bond repayment in full only if recovery rates are at least 26%, and total loss if they 
are no more than 10%. The senior position would in effect be protected by long position in a 
Recovery Put Option (short position in recovery rate=”Payer of realized recovery rate”) for up to 
20% of the exposure and exposed to the short position in a recovery put option (long position in 
recovery rate=”Receiver” of realized recovery rate) for up to 30% of the exposure, thus obtaining 
net exposure to recovery rates that are 20% to 30% below the forward recovery rate. These 
recovery rates of 0% to 10% represent the most extreme shortfalls of the recovery rate below the 
forward recovery swap rate of 30%. These events are cumulatively in the range of shortfall 
designated by the attachment points least likely to occur, even if there is a bimodal distribution of 
recovery rates. 
                                                 
44 The premium of an Equity Default Swap (far-out-of-the-money barrier put option) is estimated by 
Felsenheimer/Gisdakis/Zaiser (2006), p.497 to be 3x the Credit Default Swap. The recovery put option premium 
might be viewed as lying close to mid-way between the two extremes, i.e. 2x the CDS premium. Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
 
 
HfB – Business School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 73  39 
 
3.6   “Triple Play”: Possible Innovative NPL Portfolio Exit Strategy?  
The above discussion of trends in credit risk transfer and recent impulses for innovation in CDO 
risk modelling, measurement and assessment form the intuitive basis for proposing a structure 
which may be interpreted as an alternative exit strategy for private equity funds which have 
acquired very large portfolios of non-performing loans in Germany. It is necessary to stress that the 
product development idea presented here is justified intuitively, not through precise modeling of 
individual and portfolio recovery rate shortfalls, or statistical testing of such models, or practical 
implementation experience. However, as noted above, the pace of advance in modeling recovery 
risk and testing the models is explosive. Parallel to academic research, the market practitioners 
may be willing to make their own judgements about the viability and value of the possible “exit 
strategy” considered here. 
3.6.1  Rationale: Risk-adjusted Returns, New Asset Class, Innovation 
The strategy is termed “Triple Play” for three reasons. First, the required return on invested capital 
over the assumed five year horizon requires a tripling of recovery rates. In Figure 8 the recovery 
rates that are assumed for the initial state and for the upside and downside scenarios are key drivers 
of the value to the investors. For an assumed time horizon of five years, the preliminary 
calculations show that the expected recovery rate must be about three times higher for the workout 
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Such hypothesized performance, which may or may not be disproved by market practice, is that the 
sectoral specialization of the portfolio managers adds the required value needed to induce 
investors to be willing to take the risk which the managers are willing to hedge. Although “sector” 
has been interpreted here to be defined as “industrial sector” (for example, in the sense of S&P’s 
11 sectors), alternative types of specialization by Sector Focus Fund managers are conceivable, 
such as the type of real estate object for which mortgage loans have been granted (for example, 
commercial office buildings, industrial properties, apartments, single-family and muti-family 
houses, etc). Specialization, not diversification, is the basis for the strategy. Of course, for a shorter 
time horizon, a tripling of the portfolio recovery rate is not required. 
The term “Triple Play” also refers to the novel category of asset class. The CDO structure that 
corresponds to the NPL investment fund exit strategy proposed here can be designated “partially 
funded synthetic SME NPL CDO”
45. 
-  SME: Borrowers are small- and medium sized enterprises. The risk transfer of portfolios of 
non-performing loans has heretofore concentrated on corporates and sovereigns. 
-  NPL: The status of the loans to the borrowers is non-performing. CDO’s for SME’s have 
focused on performing loans (CLO’s) and bonds (CBO’s). 
-  Synthetic CDO: The credit risk transfer mechanism is partially funded synthetic securitization. 
In Germany, the preferred mechanism for transfer of portfolio credit risk of non-performing 
loans has been true sale. By dramatically reducing transactions costs of credit risk transfer, a 
wholesale secondary market for different degrees of risk exposure to middle-market non-
performing loan portfolio credit risk is made possible through the use of credit derivatives. 
Finally, the rationale for the “Triple Play” strategy is the fact that risk modeling, measurement and 
management financial innovations can all be incorporated into the structure as the relevant 
breakthroughs occur. Whereas banks are required under Basel II to price risk and hold regulatory 
capital according to expected loss unexpected loss of  individual loans adjusted for assumed 
common correlation with a single systematic risk factor (except for retail portfolio), the synthetic 
SME NPL CDO structure will enable non-bank investors to price risk and allocate  economic 
capital according  to exposure to counterparty risk and to portfolio and tranche expected and 
unexpected loss, which depends on three types of parameters that are the focus of quantative 
credit risk research and credit derivative product development: 
-  Expected loss of individual loans (mean) and counterparties 
-  Unexpected loss or expected shortfall of individual loans (volatility/variance) and 
counterparties 
                                                 
45 For a discussion of CDO structures as balance sheet management tools, see Picone (2004) of Royal Bank of 
Scotland in Perraudin(2004), pp. 181-214, especially Fig. 8, p. 199, and the reference to Goodman(2001) of UBS 
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-  Correlations of losses between pairs of exposures (conditional upon sector)  
As the relevant basic academic research and applied research and development in financial 
institutions progresses, the demonstration of the feasibility and value of new structures using 
portfolios of credit derivatives will improve the chances for practitioners to complete the market 
for credit risk and to make it more efficient. 
3.6.2  Structure: Sector Focus Fund as Buyer and Seller of Recovery Risk 
The Sector Focus Fund (SFF) is the structure to implement the “Triple Play” strategy, that is to 
say, the innovative credit risk transfer exit strategy of an NPL investment fund. The SFF is both a 
buyer and seller of credit risk protection. It buys protection from its investors, debt holders and 
counterparties. It receives funding for a Collateral Account by selling a Recovery Call Option to 
the holder of the first-loss position and by selling bonds to the mezzanine bondholders. As a buyer 
of protection it is a “Payer” of the realized recovery rate in long positions in the Recovery Put 
Option contracts (short position in the recovery rate) with the senior “Reinsurers”. As a seller of 
protection it is a “Receiver” of the realized recovery rate in long positions in the Recovery Swap 
contracts (long position in recovery rates). It sells protection to the NPL investment fund. It is 
“Receiver” in recovery swap contracts with the NPL investment fund with It adds value through 
specialized sectoral expertise and workout expertise. 
3.6.2.1  CDO Issuance and Sale of Recovery Risk: Purchase of Protection 
In Figure 8, three tranches of a partially funded CDO are depicted in the bottom row. The SFF is 
enabled to purchase risk by virtue of its sale of recovery risk (purchase of protection) and 
procurement of funds from investors in credit risk. (It is in the strict sense of the word a “hedge 
fund”, but it is by no means perfectly hedged.) The first-loss position of investors is the so-called 
equity tranche. Strictly speaking, it is a long position in a recovery call option on the excess spread 
earned by the SFF on the underlying non-performing loan portfolio which has a nominal value of € 
250 million. The premium on this call option, which amounts to € 10 million, serves to partially 
fund the synthetic securitization. It is offset by the up front € 4 million fee paid by the SFF to the 
“equity” investor. The mezzanine tranche of the CDO, rated A/A and amounting to € 40 million is 
used to fund a collateral account. It holds a long position in the bond issued by the SFF. The 
collateral account funded by the bond serves to enhance the creditworthiness of the SFF as a 
protection selling counterparty to the NPL. The senior tranche of the CDO, rated AAA/Aaa is not 
funded, but is a collar. The collar consists of a long position in a 30% Recovery Put Option (short 
position on the realized recovery rate) and short position in a 20% Recovery Put Option (long 
position on the realized recovery rate). Alternatively, it may be a combination of a short position as 
“Payer” in a 20% Recovery Swap contract” and a long position as “Receiver” in a 30% Recovery 
Swap contract. This would require the SFF to be willing to forego upside potential in order to to 
lock in a recovery rate without up front payment, rather than put a floor on the recovery rate. The 
collars created by the Recovery Put Options or Recovery Swaps are sold by “Reinsurers” to the 
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A liquidity facility is necessary. It is a revolving credit facility obtained from banks which are 
highly confident that the SFF will achieve recovery rates well in excess of 30%. The liquidity 
facility serves to meet up front and running fee obligations of the SFF to its protection sellers 
which it cannot meet out of its own cash flow and to pay out to the NPL investment fund in the 
extremely unlikely case that recovery rates are below 10%. In that event, proceeds from the senior 
tranche are pledged to the R/C provider for repayment. In the event that the SFF fails to meet 
milestones (financial covenants of the R/C), the entire structure is unwound due to technical 
default of the SFF. 
3.6.2.2  Portfolio of SFF and Purchase of Recovery Risk: Sale of Protection 
The partially funded synthetic CDO puts the SFF in a position to act as a credit insurer for the NPL 
Fund which purchased loans from the originating bank. In this hypothetical example, the NPL 
Fund is assumed to have purchased € 250 million in nominal value of loans from the originating 
bank in a true sale transaction for € 75 million. (The actual transaction may have been substantially 
larger, but it is assumed here that € 250 million exposure is in one of 11 possible sectors of the 
larger portfolio.) It is assumed that the bank has already written off 70% of the value of the loans, 
and that the remaining 30% are booked by the NPL investment fund at the purchase price equal to 
the adjusted book value. 
The NPL investment fund is assumed to be willing to hedge fully this exposure to non-performing 
loans in a single sector. It is assumed to lock in the recovery rate at 30% and transfer the upside 
potential to the SFF. It will purchase protection on the entire sectoral portfolio (sub-portfolio of the 
larger NPL transaction) by buying recovery swaps on the exposure from the SFF. The SFF is rated 
at least A- because of its sector expertise, its collateral account and its liquidity facility. Moreover, 
it has recourse to its senior protection sellers (called “Reinsurers”). In Figure 8 the SFF sells € 50 
million in junior Recovery Swap protection € 200 million in senior Recovery Swap protection to 
the NPL Investment fund. The recovery risk exposure and the upside potential is thus transferred 
to the SFF, and the portfolio management responsibilities are transferred as well to the sectoral 
workout specialist. In this sense, “Triple Play” is an exit strategy for the NPL investment fund. 
However, the underlying non-performing loans remain on the books of the NPL investment fund, 
because it has hedged, rather than divested, its credit risk exposure to the borrowers in the sector. 
Of course, it still has a counterparty exposure to the SFF. 
3.6.3  Economics: Risks and Returns to Protection Buyers and Sellers 
Is the structure sketched above economically viable? Economic viability requires both feasibility 
and efficiency. The transaction is feasible if the issuer of the CDO, the SFF, is willing to purchase 
protection and procure funding on terms which the investors in the tranches are willing to sell it. 
The transaction is efficient if, after taking account of all transactions costs, the SFF earns a return 
on invested capital (ROIC) which is at least as high as its weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) and if the investors are earning at least their required risk-adjusted return on capital. Such 
a situation adds value for both the issuer and the investor, and it reduces credit risk for the NPL Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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investment fund. If the the “Triple Play” meets these conditions, it is a win-win-win situation for 
the issuer, the investors and the NPL investment fund. The following discussion attempts to 
calibrate key parameters which characterize the performance of the “Triple Play” in order to guage 
the economics required for the transaction to take place. 
The analysis procedes in three steps. First, an upside scenario is developed which specifies returns 
to the issuer (SFF) and the investors of the three tranches of the partially funded synthetic CDO. A 
subjective probability is assigned to the upside scenario. Second, a downside scenario is considered 
which shows losses to the parties involved in the transaction. A subjective probability is also 
assigned to this scenario. Third, the expected returns are calculated based on the assumed returns 
and subjective probabilities. These are compared to the cost of capital commensurate with the 
degree of risk usually taken by private equity investors. 
For both scenarios the following assumptions hold for the SFF 
-  Invested Capital: € 75 million (30% of nominal value of portfolio) 
-  Debt/Equity Ratio = 12,5:1 
-  Tax rate= 25% 
-  WACC=9,0% (assume 20% required return on equity for hedged portfolio) 
For the investor in the first-loss position “equity tranche”, the following assumptions hold in both 
scenarios 
-  Invested Capital: € 10 million (=4% of nominal value of portfolio) 
-  40% up-front fee on funds provided  
-  Required return on equity: 25% 
The value of the SFF portfolio of recovery swaps depends on the success of the portfolio manager 
in realizing a recovery rate which is higher than the foreward recovery rate. The NPL investment 
fund has purchased protection to lock in the foreward recovery rate. If it is lower, then the SFF 
must pay out to the NPL investment fund. If it is higher, the SFF retains all proceeds higher than 
the foreward recovery rate. For illustrative purposes, it is assumed that the Recovery Rating for the 
facilities in the portfolio initially is 4, representing 30% recovery rate. 
3.6.3.1  Upside Scenario (RR 1 with 99% probability) 
After 5 years of restructuring and reorganization of 100 firms each with an average exposure of € 
2,5 million, the workout team with sectoral expertise has achieved a recovery rating of 1, 
representing a recovery rate of 96%. It is assumed that the 5-year rating transition probability from 
RR4 to RR 1 is 99%. In other words, it is nearly certain that the workout team is highly successful. 
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loss position respectively. They may expect to achieve a return on invested capital that exceeds or 
equals their required rates of return. 
Table 11: SFF Performance: Upside Scenario, Downside Scenario, Expected Values 










Terminal Cash Flow  € 152 million  € 75 million  € 151 million 
ROIC  14,4%  - 5,9%  13,8% 
ROE  22,5%  - 23,7%  22,3% 
EVA Margin  5,4%  -19,1%  5,2,0% 
EVA  € 4 million  -€ 14,3 million  € 3,8 million 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 12: Equity Tranche Performance: Upside Scenario, Downside Scenario, Expected Values 










Excess Spread  € 31 million  0  € 30 million 
ROIC  37,5%  -100%  36,125% 
ROE  25%  -100%  23,75% 
EVA Margin  12,5%  -75%  11,375% 
EVA  €7,5 million  -€ 7,5 million  - €7,425million 
Source: Author’s calculations 
3.6.3.2  Downside Scenario (RR 6 with 1% probability) 
The downside scenario assumes a transition to Recovery Rating 6 with 0% recovery in 5 years and 
a transition probability of 1%. The corresponding performance of the portfolios of credit risks to 
which the SFF and the first loss “equity tranche” investor are exposed are shown in Tables 11 and 
12. The SFF, which is a payer of protection, liquidates the collateral account and fully draws the 
liquidity facility for payment of € 75 million (30% recovery rate) to the NPL investment fund, 
which is the ultimate receiver of protection. 
SFF’s contingent invested capital of € 75 million (€ 50 million from the junior and € 25 million 
from the senior tranche) suffers a total loss. Consequently, investors in the equity, mezzanine and 
senior tranches issued by the SFF, lose their entire capital as well. The equity investor, which has Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
 
 
HfB – Business School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 73  45 
 
received a € 4 upfront fee, incurs a net loss of € 6 million. The capital of the mezzanine investor, 
which has provided € 40 million in funds, is wiped out. The senior tranche investors in the SFF, 
which have sold a senior recovery put option on the last 10% of the nominal value to default, lose € 
25 million, which are used to repay the liquidity facility, once the NPL investment fund has been 
received priority payment under the recovery swap. The SFF is very thinly capitalized (i.e. highly 
leveraged at 12,5:1 debt/equity ratio); its equity capital is raised by selling the recovery call option 
to the “Equity Provider” who takes the first-loss position in the capital structure. Although 
nominally € 10 million, the SFF incurs an expense of € 4 million in fees to raise € 10 million of 
equity, and it pays out any excess spread that has accumulated in the SFF after 5 years. 
As will be elaborated in detail below, through the establishment of the SFF, the credit risk 
exposure of the NPL investment fund to a recovery rate of 0% (or, in principle, up to 30%) is 
hedged. The SFF offers the upside potential to investors of nearly 100% recovery rate, thanks to its 
specialization in sector-specific credit risk exposure and its workout expertise. This amounts to an 
improvement of nearly 70% over the usual 30%. The improvement potentially adds value that is 
distributable to investors. However, “there is no such thing as a free lunch.” In an efficient market, 
rewards cannot be achieved without exposure to risk and uncertainty. 
The equity-like first loss position is exposed to the first 4% (i.e. € 10 million) of principal loss 
below a recovery rate of 30% on the € 250 million NPL portfolio managed by the SFF This 
exposure occurs when the recovery rate lies between 26% and 30% which is between 4% and 0% 
below the 30% Forward Recovery Rate. The mezzanine tranche is exposed to the next 16% failure 
to recover 30% on the € 250 million portfolio of NPL’s (i.e. € 40 million). This loss is incurred for 
recovery rates between 10% and 26%, i.e. between 20% and 4% below the contracted 30% 
Forward Recovery Rate. The senior position is exposed to the final 10% loss (€ 25 million) on the 
€ 250 million total exposure for recovery rates between 0% and 10%, which is between 30% and 
20% below the Forward 30% Forward Recovery Rate. 
The sequence of these risk exposures is listed in decreasing order of their respective likelihoods. 
However, for the present downside scenario, it is assumed that all three tranches suffer total losses 
with probability 1%. The choice of two scenarios simplifies the presentation, but leads to logical 
inconsistencies because there are three classes of downside risk exposure that are “state 
dependent”. A more complete and consistent analysis would have a minimum of four scenarios 
(one upside and three downside). The setup of the single downside scenario simply assumes the 
least likely event and highest cumulative value at risk: 30% below the Recovery Forward Rate of 
30%, i.e. zero recovery. The SFF is simply the mechanism for transferring the entire rcovery risk 
from the NPL investment fund to the “Equity Provider”, the “Bondholder” and the “Reinsurer”:  
-  Equity Provider: The loss of the first loss-position of the “Equity Provider”, of course, is equal 
to the premium on the long position in the recovery call option which is not exercised: € 10 
million gross (€ 6 million net of up front fee). These proceeds are held in the collateral account 
and booked as SFF equity. The funds are used by the SFF to meet its obligations to the NPL 
investment fund under the recovery swap with a 30% forward recovery rate. The SFF net 
exposure is zero. Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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-  Bondholder: The greatest loss, in absolute terms, is suffered by the mezzanine tranche 
bondholder (the “Bondholder”) which holds a long position in a worthless debt claim: € 40 
million. The collateral account is depleted fully because the SFF transfers the funds to the NPL 
investment fund which still has title to the loans but which is counterparty to the SFF for 
recovery swaps at the 30% forward recovery rate. Thus the SFF has a short position on the 
bond, which may be viewed as a forward contract for money, but a long position in the 
recovery swap. The net exposure is zero. The exact likelihood of the loss to the Bondholder is 
also neglected here, but in reality is less likely to experience this downside scenario than the 
“Equity Provider” and more likely to incur losses than the senior recovery put option provider 
(the “Reinsurer”).  
-  Reinsurer: In this simplified setup, the senior recovery put option provider (the “Reinsurer”), 
which has a short position in the put option position (long position in the recovery rate), must 
be in a position to pay € 25 million with 1% probability over a time horizon of 5 years as 
payoff to the SFF which has a long position in the put option. Unlike the case with the first two 
tranches, the proceeds from the Reinsurer are used to repay the liquidity facility drawn by the 
SFF to pay the NPL investment fund under the recovery swap agreement. 
3.6.3.3  Economics 
The economics of the transaction depend on the probability weighted average values of the returns 
shown in Tables 11 and 12. These returns are net of “transactions costs” which have not been 
elaborated upon. The establishment and operation of the SFF represents the most significant 
transactions cost of the credit risk transfer from the NPL investment fund to the investors in the 
tranches of the SFF synthetic securitization. The other major cost is incurred because protection is 
provided for a price. 
Thus, two additional issues, which are largely, but not entirely, independent of the  ex post 
scenarios need to be addressed to understand the economics of the SFF: (1) cost of establishment 
and operation of the portfolio managment special purpose vehicle; (2) pricing of risks absorbed by 
the investors. The cost of operation is higher in the upside scenario since the portfolio managers of 
the SFF are incentivized to perform well through their participation in the success (upside) of the 
operation by receiving bonus payments. Moreover, the pricing is dependent on the  ex ante 
scenarios of the investors in the instruments issued by the SFF, which may or may not be identical 
to the assumed ex post scenarios. 
Transactions costs: The assumptions about the fees to establish and manage the operations of SFF 
and the operating expenses underlying the calculations in Tables 11 and 12 are as follows: 
-  SFF staff for 100 NPL of 100 borrowers 
-  1 Senior manager with industry focus 
-  1 Manager with workout focus Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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-  2 Teams each working on 4 workouts 
-  1 month per workout per year 
-  3 Monitors per team + ½ Adm. Asst. 
-  Professional consultancy: € 0,5 MM per yr. 
-  4 „calls“ per week; weekly reporting 
The incentive payment, which aligns the interests of the portfolio mangers of the SFF with the 
interests of the investors in risk adjusted returns and the interests of NPL investment fund in value 
creating risk management, is calculated on the basis of value-added by improving the recovery 
rate. In the upside scenario, with 96% recovery, the nominal amount recovered is € 240 million. 
The 30% recovery rate, which presumably is expected without the use of the sector specific 
workout expertise of the SFF, is not value added by the portfolio managers, and thus must be 
netted out of the proceeds recovered. 
The resulting € 165 million represent value added. It is assumed that the portfolio managers and 
the teams supporting them receive in total 10% of this amount, or € 16,5 million. Of course, 
generally the bonus payment is contingent upon the realized recovery rate. With recovery of 30% 
or less, no bonus is paid. In effect, the team has a long position in a recovery call option which is 
part of the compensation package. Also, there could be a sliding scale with the percentage 
participation rising with the recovery rate. In that case the performance-based part of the pay 
package consists of a portfolio of call options with different triggers. 
The fixed part of the compensation package represents salaries. Along with minimal operating 
costs, this amounts to € 1.500.000 p.a. in the present calculations. The costs of establishing the SFF 
and use of outside consultants (lawyers, accountants, consultants) is assumed to equal the same 
amount 1.500.000 p.a. Thus, total costs p.a. of € 3.000.000 p.a. of the SFF need to be covered. 
Pricing: It is assumed that the SFF passes through the pricing of the risk premia of the tranches 
through the fees it charges to the NPL funds for the recovery swaps. These fees include the 
transactions costs just described, but not the bonus payments. It does not include the cost of funds 
for the partially funded tranche and the liquidity facility. The critical issue is the pricing of CDO 
tranches for a SPV which holds a sectorally non-diversified portfolio of credit recovery swaps on 
non-performing loans. To the author’s knowledge, there are no existing pricing models for this 
special purpose. However, as the state-of-the-art in CDO pricing evolves, it may be expected that 
financial engineers will come up with reasonable approximations. 
What might be done by practitioners in the mean time to obtain a workable benchmark? At present, 
the pragmatic approach taken is to attempt to assess where the risk lies in relation to instruments 
that have been priced which are both riskier than and less risky than the CDO structure proposed 
here. As noted above, Felsenheimer/Gisdakis/Zaiser price Equity Default Swaps at three times the Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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premium of Credit Default Swaps.
46 If benchmark pricing of tranches of CDOs with portfolios of 
Credit Default Swaps can be found, then it appears to this author that the premia for the present 
structure should be slightly more than 2x that of the CDO CDS portfolio benchmark. 
In a recent paper by Hull and White (2005), monte carlo simulation of a portfolio of credit default 
swaps on the DJ CDX IG NA (Dow Jones, Credit Default Swap Index for Investment Grade 
Issuers in North America) using structural models of economic default of the underlying borrowers 
came up with the following results of defaults assuming correlation of 0.5  
-  0-3% Upfront 40% + 500 bp p.a. 
-  3 - 7% Tranche: 370 bp p.a. 
-  7 - 10% Tranche: 211 bp p.a 
-  10-15% Tranche: 130 bp p.a 
-  15-30% Tranche: 50 bp p.a. 
-  Super Sr Tranche N/A (proxy: 25 bp)  
-  Average: H&W CDO Tranches 67.6 bp 
In the author’s judgement, a weighted average of 160 bp or € 4.000.000 p.a. would be appropriate 
for the “Triple Play” proposed in this paper. This margin would result from 
-  4%= at 1000 bp p.a. (unrated) 
-  16% at 300 bp p.a. (A/A) 
-   80% at 100 bp (AAA/Aaa) 
In effect the margins are between 2x-3x those calculated for the DJ CDX IG NA. These unusual 
margins given the ratings represent substantial excess returns (high alphas) due to the high 
complexity of the transaction and extreme uncertainty about the performance of the portfolio 
managers. Nevertheless, the ratings are justified because the probability distributions of recovery 
rates. Based on simulations using historical defaulted debt and fitted Beta distributions of losses for 
a well diversified portfolio, Hagmann, Renault and Scaillet (2005) report Credit VAR at the 99% 
confidence level is approximately 15%. In other words there is a 99% probability that the 
maximum loss will not exceed 15% on defaulted debt analyzed in the portfolio. For the 99.9% 
confidence level, the maximum loss (Credit VAR) is placed at between 20% and 25%. These 
simulations are in line with a pathbreaking empirical study by Grunert and Weber (2005) for 120 
                                                 
46 Felsenheimer/Gisdakis/Zaiser (2006), p. 497. See Fn. 42 and Picone (2004), pp. 202-205. For a survey of average 
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defaulted loans processed by a large bank in Germany which shows the mean recovery rate to be 
around 70% and the median recovery rate over 90%. 
For the Credit Recovery Swaps considered above, it is extremely unlikely that the losses will 
exceed 70%, i.e. that the recovery rate will fall below 30%. Implicitly, in the author’s view, the 
assumption driving the NPL market in Germany is that the originating banks were averse to 
investing permanently and massively in an efficient workout organization because the 
unanticipated wave of distressed debt was viewed as transitory and furthermore, the unusually high 
staffing of highly qualified personnel necessary to clean up the balance sheet rapidly in time for 
Basel II would have been more costly in the long run than selling the NPL’s at a deep discount to 
distressed debt funds with proven track records of recovery. 
The ratings assigned above are based on the author’s view of the probabilities of recovery rates 
falling to within the specified range of the tranche below 30%. The ratings are assumed to be 
analagous to typical probabilities of default for securities rated in these categories. As data on the 
performance of German sector-specific SME NPL CDO’s accumulate, these premia may be 
expected to drop sharply. 
Finally it should be mentioned that a partially funded synthetic securitization implies that the costs 
of funds for the collateral account and the liquidity facility must be absorbed. In the present model, 
this cost is interest expense of the SFF whose operations are expected to yield capital gains and 
thus ROIC that is sufficient to cover its weighted average cost of capital. The NPL investment fund 
is not charged with this cost of debt financing the SFF. It is charged for the cost of transferring 
recovery risk. The risk premia charged by the SFF to the NPL investment fund are passed through 
to the investors. The SFF thus charges its hedging costs and operating expenses, exclusive of the 
cost of funded debt. These charges together have been estimated to be € 7.000.000 p.a. This 
amounts to 2.8% p.a. of € 250.000.000 nominal value of loans held by the NPL investment fund or 
9.3% of the € 75 million book value of the defaulted loans which normally are rated D and thus 
command a risk premium well above 10% p.a. That is the estimated annual cost to the NPL 
investment fund for locking in a recovery rate of 30% on its entire portfolio. This cost could be 
recovered by locking in a higher recovery rate, which permits realization of capital gains that can 
be netted agains the costs of hedging. 
3.6.3.4  Specialization vs Diversification: Lessons to be Learned  
The key driver of the Sector Focus Fund structure presented above is the specialization of the 
portfolio manager in an industrial sector.
47 The fundamental thesis of this paper is that sectoral 
specialization adds (“creates”) more value than it foregoes (“destroys”) by failing to reduce of risk 
through diversification. Why could this be so? The answer, in brief, is “learning effects”. 
                                                 
47 As mentioned above, there is disagreement among researchers and rating agencies regarding the influence of the 
sector on recovery rates. The short survey by Schuermann (2005) in Altman, Resti and Sironi (2005), pp. 19-20 
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The issue of focus vs diversification in commercial banking has been explored by a number of 
researchers in finance, most notably by Andrew Winton, who analyzed the implicatons of 
“Winner’s Curse.”
48 As has been suggested above, the quality of the delegated monitor is subject 
to the decisions of the financial institution’s management. Consequently, the exposure to loss is to 
some extent endogenous. As was argued in the interpretation of the KAMCO case study, the 
experience of the portfolio manager can improve the quality of the monitor. This argument can be 
taken one step further by noting that the relevant experience in reorganizing and restructuring a 
business requires sector specific expertise. This belief is widely shared in the venture capital and 
private equity investing communities. 
Diversification does not make use of this expertise and learning experience. Loan portfolio 
diversification strategies assume that the loss distribution is exogenous to the evolution of the 
lender’s monitoring expertise. By diversifying into sectors for which it has little or no expertise, a 
portfolio manager can be exposed to “Winner’s Curse”. An adverse selection of high credit risk 
exposures results from the fact that the unknowledgeable lender wins business which has been 
rejected by the knowledgeable lender. Specialization increases the likelihood that the financial 
institution is capable of “picking winners”. 
Figure 10 illustrates the hypothetical impact of the cumulative volume of assets under management 
of a diversified and focused fund for managing NPL’s on its expected loss. 
Figure 10 
























































                                                 
48 Winton (1999) and Winton (2004). The originators and proponents of the key idea appear to be Broecker (1990), 
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An analagous graph would apply for unexpected loass. For small cumulative volumes of funds 
under management the experience of the sectorally focused bank is not pronounced. The diagram 
shows that there is an opportunity cost of specialization. However, as the sectoral specialist learns 
from experience, expected and unexpected losses may be expected to decline. In this sense, the 
pro-active specialist is “picking winners” and may even be making winners. The monitor of a 
diversified portfolio forgoes this learning experience. On the contrary, lack of sectoral knowledge 
increases risk. 
For the diversified portfolio, it is assumed that the sectoral diversification is not achieved 
instantaneously, but rather sequentially. This corresponds to the experience of many banks which 
have diversified their loan portfolios over an extended period of time. The sectors with which the 
lender is progressively less and less familiar are gradually added to the portfolio. Whereas static 
modern portfolio theory would suggest that a mix of winners and losers in each sector will result, 
the Winner’s Curse hypothesis suggests that unfamiliarity with the sector will bias  dynamic 
selection towards those lenders which sectoral specialists or relationship banks have deemed 
lacking in creditworthiness or no longer creditworthy. After a certain point the expected and 
unexpected losses begin to rise as the diversification strategy leads to more and more 
counterproductive “Wins” in the sense of “Winner’s Curse”. 
The implication of this dynamic argument is that there is a gain from specialization, not a loss due 
to foregone static diversification effects. For the SFF, which is organized along these lines, that 
gain is reflected in the high expected recovery rate and lower viariability of recovery rates 
compared to a fund whose monitoring does not benefit from sector specific learning effects. Here 
“Winners” that are picked are defaulting borrowers which are put in a position to meet their 
original debt servicing obligations. Concretely, for example, knowledge of the industry can 
facilitate debt/equity swaps and subsequent mergers and acquisition transactions which enhance 
recovery rates considerably and signficantly if the borrower’s company is turned around. 
The main lesson to be learned is that learning from experience is the key driver of added value in 
the “Triple Play” structure. There are other lessons to be learned which show that the structure 
represents a potentially a “win-win-win” situation.  
-  Portfolio managers of the SFF are incentivized to realize the gains from high recovery rate. 
The bonus arrangement enables them to participate in the rewards of focusing on the same 
sector.  
-  The NPL investment fund benefits from the hedging of risks by the Credit Recovery Swaps or 
Credit Recovery Options that are employed to transfer risks to the “Equity Investors”, 
“Mezzanine Investors” and “Reinsurers” by lowering its WACC.  
-  The “Mezzanine Investors (Bondholders)” benefit from subordination of the equity tranche, and 
the “ Reinsurers”, who invest in the senior swap or option tranches, benefit from the 
subordination of both of the junior tranches. The “Equity Investor” is rewarded for assuming 
the high risk of the first-loss position by claims on excess spread at final maturity. All investors 
benefit from the liquidity facility, which also sets milestones that need to be met. Otherwise the Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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structure must be unwound. This termination threat is a penalty for poor asset management 
quality. 
3.6.4  Assessment: NPL Fund Exit Strategy and/or Strategy for Success?  
The “Triple Play” is an innovative exit strategy for the NPL invetment fund. It employs synthetic 
securitization (SME NPL CDO) to transfer credit risk, while retaining the title to the loans which it 
has acquired. This strategy devolves portfolio management responsibility to the Sector Focus Fund. 
Therefore,  the NPL investment fund does not “fix it”, i.e. restructure the portfolio companies and 
loans so that they are converted to performing assets. The strategy is not a true sale, either. Title 
remains with the NPL investment fund, but risk is transferred ultimately to the investors through 
the SFF. Last, but not least, it is not a liquidation (“shut it down”). On the contrary, by allowing 
specialists to apply sectoral and workout expertise, the chances of liquidation are reduced. Thus it 
is not a “stealth” liquidation strategy by handing that decision over to a third party. 
Since 70% of the value of the original € 250 million portfolio has presumably been written off by 
the originating bank, the NPL investment fund is not exposed to this loss. Upon completing the 
True Sale, it acquired an exposure to loss of 30% on the NPL portfolio value. While the nominal 
amount of the “Triple Play” transaction is € 250 million, the portfolio is booked at the value-
adjusted purchase price. The “Triple Play” allows the NPL investment fund to hedge the book 
value of the credit risk exposure. The expected loss on the credit exposure of the € 75 million is 
nearly zero thanks to the hedging contracts with the SFF. The unexpected loss is reduced by an 
amount which depends on the net effects of higher correlation among the loans (cost of sector 
focus) and the higher recovery from better monitoring (benefits of sector focus). 
The “Triple Play” is also a strategy for success of the NPL investment fund’s portfolio. There are a 
number of positive economic impacts that may be mentioned. 
First, the structure’s utilization of Credit Recovery Swaps or Credit Recovery Options creates a 
real option to extend the workout period. The additional specialists who are employed by the 
Sector Focus Fund are presumably selected for their good reputations in achieving high recovery 
rates, given sufficient time and resources to achieve this goal. Of course, if the specialists are 
highly productive, the time to recovery could even be reduced. Implicitly the assumption 
underlying this positive impact is that liquidation is more likely to be the exit strategy when 
resources are not focused on the sectoral exposure. The synthetic securitization thus creates the 
flexibility inherent in a real call option to extend the time to recovery. 
Second, the structure aligns the incentives of the delegated monitors with those of the NPL 
investment fund investors and the recovery risk investors. The SFF portfolio managers perceive not 
only the opportunity of the bonus arrangement, but also the threat of unwinding the entire 
transaction if milestones are not met. Such an incentive alignment reduces the agency costs that 
usually arise through a principal’s delegation of responsibilities to an agent whose interests diverge 
from those of the principal. In the theoretical literature the word “shirking” is used indiscriminantly Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
 
 
HfB – Business School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 73  53 
 
to suggest that the effort of the agent is not commensurate with the responsibility. This is terribly 
misleading, because an agent with a mandate to manage a diversified NPL portfolio is limited in 
the ability to perform, no matter how intensive the effort, due to the “Winner’s Curse”. 
Optimal design of compensation packages is one proposed solution to the “Agency Problem”. Such 
a solution works only if there is reasonable prospect for adding value through additional “effort” 
or, more appropriate in the case of SFF, a more effective combination of sectoral expertise and 
workout expertise. Alignment of incentives is achieved by creating a call option on the recovery 
rate for the portfolio mangement in the form of a peformance based bonus which has a reasonable 
chance of being paid. In so doing, it also reduces information asymmetries between monitor and 
borrower. The portfolio manager becomes a pro-active consultant to the borrower. This reduces the 
moral hazard present in every borrower-lender relationship, because the pro-active specialist risk-
bearing SFF is incentivized to know much more about the borrower and its sector than the original 
lender or the NPL investment fund. As analysed incisively by Aoki (2001), this effect is well-
known in the venture capital industry, for example, in Silicon Valley. 
Third, the SFF is likely to be biased towards non-distressed debt sale as its exit strategy. Thus 
restructuring and debt/equity swaps increase in importance relative to liquidation as the main 
sources of recovery proceeds. This shift in strategy protects the value of intangible assets (human 
capital) in the borrowers’ firms. It profits from knowledge and experience of cooperating focused 
specialists in bankruptcy law, credit risk accounting, turnaround specialists, private debt and equity 
placement experts and last but not least, industry-specific business planning and forecasting 
knowhow.
49 All participants capitalize on what Hayek termed “the division of knowledge”, which 
he viewed as being as significant as the gains from “division of labor”. 
3.4   Outlook: Meeting the Challenges to overcome Limitations 
The obstacles to implementing the Sectoral Focus Fund structure are considerable. Successful 
implementation will require an awareness of the constraints and a concerted effort to overcome 
these limitations. Table 13 lists the main contstraints and suggests actions that may be appropriate 
to eliminate them. 
                                                 
49 GE Commercial finance Corporate Financial Services (2005).  Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Table 13: Sector Focus Fund: Actions to Remove Constraints 
Limitation/Constraint  Action to overcome constraint 
Complexity of models of individual facility recovery and 
portfolio recovery risk and pricing 
Applied R&D in universities, financial institutions, rating 
agencies (Moody’s, S&P’s, Fitch); emphasis on 
transparency and closed formed solutions 
Lack of data for validating individual and portfolio 
recovery risk models; weak IT infrastructure 
EU wide participation in Pan European Credit Data 
Consortium (PECDC); IT infrastructure outsourcing 
Restrictive regulatory treatment of double-default 
(substitution approach) and excess spreads (disallowed as 
mitigant); need for fair value accounting of credit-linked 
assets 
Learning from experience; benchmarking based on non-
bank banks that are successful in making use of sector-
specific expertise (e.g. GE Commercial Finance) 
Uncertainty regarding size of Sector Focus Fund portfolios 
and credit recovery swap/option pricing 
Coopetition: first round buyers of SME NPL’s pool sector 
specific exposures in SPV to attain critical mass for SFF 
portfolio (“reverse syndication”); disclosure of non-bank 
CRS deals with corporates 
Staffing of portfolio managers/servicers  Recruiting former successful CEO’s, CFO’s of firms in 
specific sectors; entry of sector specific private equity and 
venture capital managers into NPL market; entry of 
experienced turnaround consultants 
 
In the author’s opinion, it will take between 1½ to 2 years to overcome these limitations. The first 
credit recovery swaps in Germany will probably be offered for individual investment grade non-
defaulting corporate names. Large portfolios of credit recovery swaps are likely to appear first for 
large homogenous pools (home mortgages, auto loans). The emergence of a market for SME NPL 
portfolios will depend critically on the  recovery data base (PECDC) and  consensus on the 
defintion of sectors. There are alternatives to the S&P GICS 
(R) such as the FAZ branches. The 
latter choice would theoretically enable the investors to hedge their sectoral recovery exposures in 
the German stock market. Reverse syndication of recovery risk is made possible by collecting the 
risk exposure to many borrowers in a single special purpose vehicle and then hedging that 
concentrated risk exposure to many borrowers by syndicating this risk to participants in the capital 
market or private placement market.
50  
                                                 
50 Usually syndication of credit risk is the dispersion of the credit exposure to one borrower by distributing it to 
many lenders. The process proposed here is the concentration of the risk exposure to many borrowers in a one 
special purpose entity and then redistribution (syndication) of that credit derivative portfolio exposure to many 
investors willing to assume different degrees of credit risk, depending on the tranche held.  
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In view of the time required for such an evolution, explosive growth over the next two years 
appears unlikely. Moreover, it will take time for SFF portfolio managers to establish proven track 
records over the business cycle. Once these conditions are met, the considerable benefits to society 
and value to businesses of such a prudent use of credit derivatives, which enable small and 
medium-sized enterprises to indirectly gain access to capital markets, may become readily 
apparent. If the success of the “Triple Play” strategy and SFF strucure is demonstrated, an increase 
in the political pressure for further liberalization of the legal and regulatory framework for 
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Appendix: Recovery Risk Rating Case Study: Delphi Corp 
 
Fitch Recovery Analysis: Delphi Corp. Step 1 
Valuation – Going Concern 
EBITDA 
Estimated sustainable EBITDA  875.0 
X (100-Haircut) % (EBITDA Discount=20%)  80% 
= Distressed EBITDA  696.0 
Enterprise Value – Going Concern Value 
Distressed EBITDA  696.0 
X Market EBITDA Multiple  5x 
= Estimated Going Concern Value  3,480 
Source: Fitch (2005d), p. 4 
 
Fitch Recovery Analysis: Delphic Corp. Step 1 
Valuation - Liquidation Value 
Asset  Balance  Advance Rates  Liquidation Value 
Cash  1,000.0     
Accounts Receivable   5,295.0  60  3,177.0 
Inventory  2,264.0  50  1,132.0 
Property,Plant&Equipment  5,609.0  25  1,402.3 
Intangible  844.0  25  211.0 
= Total  15,012.0    5,922.3 
Source: Fitch (2005d), p.4 Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Fitch Recovery Analysis Delphi Corp: Step 2 
Determination of Distribution Value (Creditor Mass) 
Greater of Going Concern or Liquidation Value  5,922.3 
Administrative and Priority Claims (15%)  888.3 
Collaborative Payments (5%)  296.1 
Adjusted Enterprise Value (Creditor Mass)  4,737.8 
====== 
Source: Fitch (2005d), p.4 
 
Fitch Recovery Analysis Delphi Corp: Step 3 
Prioritization of Claims w PBGC* 












Priority Claims  1500        1500  1500  100  N/A 
Senior Secured    1580      1580  1580  100  N/A 
Bank Revolver    1825      1825  976  53  RR3 
Bank Term Loan    1000      1000  535  53  RR3 
Foreign Bank Lines    275      275  147  53  RR3 
6.550% Notes 6/06      500    500  69  14  RR5 
6.500% Notes 8/09      498    498  69  14  RR5 
6.500% Notes 8/13      495    496  68  14  RR5 
7.125% Debent.5/29      496    496  68  14  RR5 
Jun. Sub.Notes 33        412  412  21  5  RR6 
Source: Fitch (2005d)  Priority, Sen. Sec. Claims:R=100%; Collaborative: R=14%; Jun.Sub:R=5% Distressed Debt in Germany: What’s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
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Recovery Analysis Delphi Corp: Step 3 
Prioritization of Claims w/o PBGC* 












Priority Claims  500        500  500  100  N/A 
Senior Secured    1580      1580  1580  100  N/A 
Bank Revolver    1825      1825  1565  86  RR2 
Bank Term Loan    1000      1000  858  86  RR2 
Foreign Bank Lines    275      275  236  86  RR2 
6.550% Notes 6/06      500    500  69  14  RR5 
6.500% Notes 8/09      498    498  69  14  RR5 
6.500% Notes 8/13      495    496  68  14  RR5 
7.125% Debent.5/29      496    496  68  14  RR5 
Jun. Sub.Notes 33        412  412  21  5  RR6 
Source: Fitch (2005d)  Priority, Sen. Sec. Claims:R=100%; Collaborative: R=14%; Jun.Sub:R=5% 
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Impact of Recovery Rating on Debt Ratings 
Delphi Corp: Relative Value “Notching Effects” 
Status/Obligation  RR  Notching  Rating 
Before Bankruptcy Filing Announcement: Issuer Default Rating: B- 
Senior Secured Bank Facilities  RR3  +1  B 
Senior Unsecured Notes and Debs.  RR5  -1  CCC+ 
Junior Subordinated Notes  RR6  -2  CCC 
Scenario: Post Banruptcy: Expected Issuer Default Rating: CCC+ 
Senior Secured Bank Facilities  RR2  +2  B 
Senior Unsecured Notes and Debs  RR5  -1  CCC 
Junior Subordinated Notes  RR6  -3  CC+ 
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